Σήφης Βαλυράκης για Siemens και πολιτικό σύστημα – ΒΙΝΤΕΟ

Ως το μεγαλύτερο σκάνδαλο της χώρας χαρακτήρισε την υπόθεση Siemens o Σήφης Βαλυράκης, κατά τη διάρκεια της ακρόασής του από την Επιτροπή Θεσμών και Διαφάνειας της βουλής.

Αναφερόμενος στην Εξεταστική Επιτροπή για τη Siemens, της οποίας είχε διατελέσει πρόεδρος, είπε ότι κυριολεκτικά εξάντλησε τις δυνατότητες που είχε, ενώ εκτίμησε ότι μπορεί να υπάρχουν νέα στοιχεία. “Επειδή υπήρχαν διαδικασίες ιδιαίτερα χρονοβόρες που είχαν να κάνουν με το άνοιγμα τραπεζικών λογαριασμών και ίσως να ήρθαν απαντήσεις μετά το πέρας των εργασιών της επιτροπής και κατά τη δικαστική έρευνα που συνεχίστηκε και συνεχίζεται, ενδεχομένως να έχουμε και νεότερα στοιχεία”.

“Πράγματι ενώ εντοπίστηκαν εκροές μαύρου χρήματος που συσχετίζονταν με πολιτικές, υπουργικές αποφάσεις που είχαν να κάνουν με συμβάσεις σε σχέση με τη Siemens, η σχέση μαύρου χρήματος και αποδεκτών διακοπτόταν σε παρένθετα πρόσωπα. Μέναμε με την αδυναμία να γεφυρώσουμε το κενό αυτό, άρα έμενε η ίδια η Siemens να κληθεί και να εξαναγκαστεί να δώσει την πληροφορία που κατείχε, για το ποιοι ήταν διαχρονικά οι υπουργοί και υφυπουργοί, μέλη της κυβέρνησης, όσοι είχαν εμπλοκή με τις προμήθειες του δημοσίου σε σχέση με τη Siemens” τόνισε ο κ. Βαλυράκης, υπογραμμίζοντας ότι το πρόβλημα θα είχε λυθεί εάν το πολιτικό σύστημα εξανάγκαζε την ίδια τη γερμανική εταιρεία να δώσει αυτές τις πληροφορίες. “Θεωρώ ότι θα μπορούσε να γίνει μια τέτοια προσπάθεια” ανέφερε. 

“Πρόκειται για πρωτοφανές σκάνδαλο και πρόκληση για τη διαφάνεια και την καταπολέμηση της διαφθοράς και της διαπλοκής. Ξεκίνησε ως σκάνδαλο διαφθοράς και εξελίχθηκε ως σκάνδαλο συγκάλυψης”, υπογράμμισε ο κ. Βαλυράκης, λέγοντας ότι είναι σωστό που έρχεται το θέμα της ανάσυρσης της υπόθεσης στην επιτροπή αυτή που είναι το κατεξοχήν αρμόδιο όργανο.

 

“Έτσι έδιναν τις μίζες”

Ο κ. Βαλυράκης αποκάλυψε  στη συνέχεια τον τρόπο δράσης της γερμανικής εταιρείας, κάνοντας λόγο για εγκληματική οργάνωση. “Στο εσωτερικό της Siemens αποδείχθηκε ότι είχε διαμορφωθεί ιδιαίτερη οργανωτική δομή από ανώτατα στελέχη της που ενεργούσαν από κοινού ως εγκληματική οργάνωση χρησιμοποιώντας ιδιαίτερα τεχνάσματα, που αποσκοπούσαν αφενός στην εξασφάλιση μαύρου χρήματος και αφετέρου στη διοχέτευση του, χωρίς ίχνη για παράνομες ωφέλιμες- κατά τη Siemens -πληρωμές. Οι υπάλληλοι αυτοί της Siemens φαίνεται ότι διέπρατταν συστηματικά δωροδοκίες κρατικών υπαλλήλων, υπηρεσιακών και πολιτικών στελεχών, στο σύνολο των δομών του ελληνικού κράτους”, είπε. “Η εξεταστική απέδειξε ότι η Siemens υπερτιμολογούσε τις συμβάσεις της και αύξανε το κόστος των συμβάσεων κατά 10%. Παρήγαγε έτσι 8% χρήμα για να δωροδοκεί υπηρεσιακούς παράγοντες και 2% για να χρηματοδοτεί κόμματα και μέλη των κυβερνήσεων”.  

 

“Η Siemens  απολάμβανε μιας ιδιότυπης ασυλίας” 

“Η αίσθησή μας ήταν ότι η Siemens  απολάμβανε μιας ιδιότυπης ασυλίας από όλο το σύστημα” κατήγγειλε ο Σήφης Βαλυράκης και όπως σημείωσε η βουλή σε δύο συνεδριάσεις της τότε δεν είχε δώσει το “πράσινο φως” για να προχωρήσει η διαδικασία περαιτέρω, μετά το πόρισμα της εξεταστικής επιτροπής. 

“Δεν έδωσε ψήφο για περαιτέρω διερεύνηση του σκανδάλου, ούτε καν για αξιολόγηση του κατατεθέντος  πορίσματος από το αρμόδιο δικαστικό όργανο, όπως πρότεινε ομόφωνα η επιτροπή.  Ακόμα και η πρόταση για δικαστική αξιολόγηση απερρίφθη… Το πολιτικό σύστημα αποδείχθηκε ανίκανο για την αυτοκάθαρσή του και νομίζω ότι αυτό θα μας καταδιώκει μέχρι να ξεκαθαρίσουμε τι έχει συμβεί με αυτή την υπόθεση”.

“Η Επιτροπή θεσμών και Διαφάνειας μπορεί να εξαγάγει πολύ χρήσιμα πολιτικά συμπεράσματα για το αν έγινε συγκάλυψη ευθυνών και για ποιους λόγους και να προσπαθήσει στο μέτρο του δυνατού για την αποκατάσταση έστω και μέρους της τεράστιας ζημιάς -ακόμη και στο ηθικό επίπεδο -που έχει υποστεί η Ελλάδα από το σκάνδαλο της Siemens” ανέφερε μεταξύ άλλων, επισημαίνοντας ότι η Επιτροπή μπορεί παράλληλα να δώσει σε αυτή τη συγκυρία ένα παράδειγμα εθνικής συστράτευσης. 

 

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9 comments on “Σήφης Βαλυράκης για Siemens και πολιτικό σύστημα – ΒΙΝΤΕΟ


  1. https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20829.pdf

    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    1 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 1 COMMISSION, 1 100 F. Street, NE 1
    Washington, D.C. 20549 Plaintiff,

    V.

    SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT J

    Case: 1:08-cv-02167
Assigned To : Leon, Richard J. Assign. Date : 1211212008 Description: General Civil
    Wittelsbacherplatz 2
D-80333 Munich
Federal Republic of Germany

    Defendant.
    1 1 1 1 1 1

    COMPLAINT
    Plaintiff, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission7′), alleges:

    SUMMARY

    1. Between March 12,2001 and September 30,2007 (the “Relevant Period”),SiemensAktiengesellschaft(“Siemens” orthe”Company7′)violatedthe Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 115 U.S.C. 5 78dd-11 (the “FCP A”) by engaging in a widespread and systematicpractice of paying bribes to foreign government oEcials to obtainbusiness. Siemenscreatedelaboratepaymentschemestoconcealthenatureofits corrupt payments, and the Company’s inadequate internal controls allowed the illicit conduct to flourish. The misconduct involved employees at all levels of the Company, including former senior management, and reveals a corporate culture that had long been at odds with the FCPA.

    2. During this period, Siemens made thousands of separate payments to third parties in ways that obscured the purpose for, and the ultimate recipients of, the money. At least 4,283 of those payments, totaling approximately $1.4 billion, were used to bribe governmentofficialsinreturnforbusinesstoSiemensaroundtheworld. Amongthe transactions on which Siemens paid bribes were those to design and build metro transit lines in Venezuela; metro trains and signaling devices in China; power plants in Israel; high voltage transmission lines in China; mobile telephone networks in Bangladesh; telecommunications projects in Nigeria; national identity cards in Argentina; medical devices in Vietnam, China, and Russia; traffic control systems in Russia; refineries in Mexico;andmobilecommunicationsnetworksinVietnam. Siemensalsopaidkickbacks to Iraqi ministries in connection with sales of power stations and equipment to Iraq under theUnitedNationsOilforFoodProgram. Siemensearnedover$1.1billioninprofitson these fourteen categories of transactions that comprised 332 individual projects or individual sales.

    3. In November 2006, Siemens’ current management began to implement reformstotheCompany’sinternalcontrols. Thesereformssubstantiallyreduced,butdid’ notentirelyeliminate,corruptpayments. Allbut$27.5millionofthecorruptpayments occurred prior to November 15,2006.

    4. Siemens violated Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act7′) [15 U.S.C. 578dd-11 by making illicit payments to foreign governmentofficialsinordertoobtainorretainbusiness. SiemensviolatedSection 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act by failing to have an adequate internal control system in placetodetectandpreventtheillicitpayments. SiemensviolatedSection13(b)(2)(A)of the Exchange Act by improperly recording each of those payments in its accounting books and records.

    JURISDICTION
    5. ThisCourthasjurisdiction overthisactionunder Sections21(d), 21(e), and27oftheExchangeAct115U.S.C. $978u(d),78u(e)and78aaI. Siemens,directlyor indirectly, made use of the means or instrumentalitiesof interstate commerce, of the mails, or of the facilities of a national securities exchange in connection with the transactions, acts, practices, and courses of business alleged in this Complaint.
    6. Venue is appropriate in this Court under Section 27 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 5 78aaI or 28 U.S.C. 5 1391(d).

    DEFENDANT
    7. Siemens is a German corporation with its executive offices in Munich,
    FederalRepublicofGermany. Siemensisoneoftheworld’s largestmanufacturersof industrialandconsumerproducts. Siemensbuildslocomotives,trafficcontrolsystems andelectricalpowerplants. TheCompanyalsomanufacturesbuildingcontrolsystems, medical equipment and electrical components, and formerly manufactured communicationsnetworks. Siemensemploysapproximately428,200peopleand operatesinapproximately190countriesworldwide. Siemensreportednetrevenueof
    $116.5 billion and net income of $8.9 billion for its fiscal year ended September 30, 2008.
    8. In accordancewith Germanlaw, Siemenshas a SupervisoryBoard and a ManagingBoard. TheSupervisoryBoardisgenerallycomparabletotheboardof directors of a corporation in the United States in that it oversees management but with
    less oversight power under Germanlaw. The ManagingBoard-or”Vorstand”- generally performs the duties and responsibilities of senior management of a corporation in the United States and includes the Company’s Chief Executive Officer(“CEO”) and Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”).

    9. Prior to a recent reorganization, Siemens operated through a complex arrayofbusinessgroupsandregionalcompanies. Thebusinessgroupsaredivisions withinSiemensandarenotseparatelegalentities. Theregionalcompaniesarewholly- or partly-owned subsidiariesof Siemens. The thirteen principal business groups during theRelevantPeriodwere: Communications(“COM”), SiemensBusinessServices (“SBS”), AutomationandDrives(“A&D9′),IndustrialSolutionsandServices(“I&S”), SiemensBuildingTechnologies(“SBT”), PowerGeneration(“PG”),PowerTransmission andDistribution(“PTD), TransportationSystems(“Tv, SiemensVDOAutomotive (“SV”), MedicalSolutions(“MED”), OsramMiddleEast,SiemensFinancialServices (“SFS”), and Siemens Real Estate (“SRE”). In 2008, Siemens reorganized the groups into three Sectors- Energy, Healthcare and Industry.
    10. Since March 12,2001, Siemens’ American Depository Shares have been registeredwiththeCommissionpursuanttoSection12(b)oftheExchangeAct. [15 U.S.C.5781(b)]. Siemens’AmericanDepositorySharestradeontheNewYorkStock Exchange(‘WSE”) underthesymbol”SI.”

    FACTS
    A. Background
    11. Siemens traces its origins to 1847 and for over 160 years has been one of themostsuccessfulconglomeratecompaniesinGermany. AfterWorldWar11,Siemens had difficulty competing for business in many Western countries and responded by seeking business opportunities in certain less developed countries where corrupt business practices were common.
    12. During the pre- 1999 period, thef i s t period, bribery at Siemens was largelyunregulated. Germanlawdidnotprohibitforeignbriberyandallowedtax deductionsforbribespaidinforeigncountries. SiemenswasnotyetlistedontheNYSE and therefore was not subject to U.S. regulation. Undeterred by foreign laws that prohibitedbribery,Siemensputseveralpaymentmechanismsinplace, includingtheuse of cash and off-books accounts, to make payments as necessary to win business.
    13. ThetermNiitzlicheAufwendungen(“NAY’)or”useful expenditures”wasa commonly used tax law term and was commonly listed on Siemens’ cost calculation sheets to denote payments to third parties, including illicit payments to foreign officials. Though asla rule Siemens required two signatures on all major documents in accordance withanintedcontrolknownasthe”four-eyes” principle,manyexceptionstotherule were made to ensure quick accessto cash to make illicit payments.
    14. Over time, Siemens developed anetwork of payment mechanisms designed to funnel money through third parties in a way that obscured the purpose and ultimaterecipientofthefunds. Onat.leastoneproject,bribestohighranking governmentofficialswerearrangedpersonallybyamemberoftheVorstand.. The success of Siemens’ bribery system was maintained by lax internal controls over corruption related activities and an acceptance of such activities by members of senior management and the compliance, internal audit, legal and finance departments.

    1. NYSE Listing

    15. From 1999to 2003, the secondperiod,the Vorstand was ineffectivein implementing controls to address constraints imposed by Germany’s 1999 adoption of the Organizationfor Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD) anti-bribery conventionthatoutlawedforeignbribery. OnFebruary15,1999,theverydaythat Germany ratified the OECD Convention, the then-CEO of Siemens “expressed his concern at the number of criminal and other investigations into members of the Company,” further noting that “[als the Board could possibly be held responsible for
    variousoffenses,itwasimportanttotakeprotectivemeasures.” However,bribery continued for years afterward.
    16. The V orstand was also ineffective in meeting the U.S. regulatory and anti- bribery requirements that Siemens was subject to following its March 12,2001, listing on the NYSE.
    17. The changes in the legal landscape caused by Germany’s ratification of the QECD Convention and Siemens’ listing on the NYSE should have put an end to bribery at Siemens. Unfortunately, they did not. Instead, a steady flow of improper payments continued to emanate fiom the Company, in large part because of certain actions and inactions taken by the V orstand.
    18. For instance in mid-2000, as Siemens prepared for its NYSE listing, its legal department forwarded a memorandum to the Supervisory Board Chairman and CFO identifyingcertainoff-booksaccounts. ThememorandummadeitclearthatSiemens’ accounts had to be maintained “in harmony with the principles of orderly accounting.

    19. In addition, the Vorstand failed to adopt meaningll compliance measures, failed to adequately staff Siemens’ compliance function and, at times, failed to adopt reasonablerecommendationsdesignedtoenhancecomplianceproceduresatthe Company. Asillustratedherein,manyoftheimproperpaymentsmadebySiemens involved the use of business consultants and business consulting agreements to funnel illicitpaymentstothirdparties,includinggovernmentofficials. InApril2000,the VorstandrejectedaproposalbytheCompany’s GeneralCounseltocreateaCompany- widelistofbusinessconsultantsandacommitteetoreviewtheserelationships. Although Siemens issued various principles and recommendations regarding business consultants, Siemens had no mandatory and comprehensive Company-wide rules in place governing the use of business consultants until June of 2005.
    2. Red Flags (Communications Grouv – Nigeria)

    20. From 2003 to 2006, the thirdperiod, members of the Vorstand failed to respondappropriatelytoindicationsthatbriberywaswidespreadatSiemens. Redflags thattheVorstandmembersmissedorignoredincludedsubstantialcashpaymentsin NigeriabyseniorlevelemployeeswithintheCOMbusinessgroup. Inthefallof2003, Siemens’ outside auditor KPMG identified €4.12 million in cash that was brought to NigeriabyCOMemployeesandflaggedthepaymentsforreview. Acompliance attorney at the Company conducted a one-day investigation of the payments and wrote a report indicating that COM employees admitted that it was not an isolated event and warnedofnumerouspossibleviolationsoflaw. Thoughthecompliancereportwas
    reviewed in November 2003 by Siemens’ then-CFO, no disciplinary action was taken, no further investigative work was conducted, and the report was not provided to or discussed withtheVorstandasawholeortheCompany’sauditcommittee. COMemployees identified in the report, including a former COM manager, continued to pay bribes through a series of slush fundsuntil at least November 2006, when they were arrested following a raid of Siemens’ offices (the “Dawn Raid”) by criminal authorities in Munich, Germany. Had senior management responded differently, bribes paid by the COM group could have been reduced or eliminated.
    Red Flags mower Generation Grour, -Italv)


    21. During the thirdperiod, the Vorstand also failed to respond appropriately
    to multi-million dollar bribes paid in Italy by managers of the Siemens PG business group. InJuly2003,thenewsmediareportedthatprosecutorsinMilanwere investigating bribes paid to employees of ENEL, an energy company partly-owned by the Italiangovernment,inconnectionwithtwopowerplantprojects. SiemensPGmanagers madeapproximately€6millionincorruptpaymentstotwoENELofficials. Thecorrupt payments were routed through slush funds in Liechtenstein using a Dubai-based business consultant.

    22. In April 2004, a judge in Milan issued a written opinion concluding that the evidence indicated that Siemens viewed bribery “at least as a possible business strategy.” InoraroundMay2004,alegalmemorandumconcerningtherulingwassent to members of the Vorstand, including the then-CEO and then-CFO of the Company. Another memorandum, sent to members of the Vorstand, including the then-CEO and the then-CFO in April 2004, detailed severancepackages that had been given to the PG 3., managers and attached a September 2003 memorandum prepared by an American law firm. The legal memorandum suggested that Siemens should immediately review and assure proper functioning of its FCP A compliance program, that the allegations and steps taken to address them should be reported to the board, and that the employees involved should be disciplined.

    23. Subsequently, Siemens, along with two of its PG managers, entered into a plea bargain with criminal authorities in Italy pursuant to which Siemens paid a €0.5 million fine, gave up €6.2 million in profits and was barred fiom selling gas turbines in Italyforoneyear. Despitetheircriminalconduct,thetwoPGmanagersinvolvedinthe ENELmatterreceivedearlyretirementwithfullretirementbenefits. ThePGCFO received a €1.8 million severance package from Siemens when he left the Company as a resultoftheENELmatter. InarelatedcriminalproceedinginGermany,thelongtime CFOofPGconfessedtoauthorizingthebribes. Siemens’corporateresponsetobribery assured certain employees that they could expect to be taken care of if and when caught paying bribes on behalf of the Company.

    24. There were additional significant red flags of corruption including admissions of bribery or so called “bonus payments” to government officials in March 2006 by a manager at Siemens Greece of over €37 million, as well as an April 2006 KPMG audit identification of over 250 suspicious payments made through an intermediary on behalf of Information and Communication Mobile, a corporate predecessor of COM, and Siemens S.p.A in Italy.
    4. Tone at the Top

    25. The V orstand’s response to the situations in Nigeria and Italy demonstrated a tone at the top of Siemens that was inconsistent with an effective FCP A compliance program and created a corporate culture in which bribery was tolerated and even rewarded at the highest levels of the company.

    26. Siemens implementedcertainimprovementsto its compliance program in response to the situation inItaly. Theseincludedananti-briberyspeechdeliveredbythe then-CFO to high-level business managers in summer 2004 and the establishment of a CorporateComplianceOfficeinOctober2004. Inaddition,theCompanyissuedpolicies over bank accounts, including requirements relating to the initiation and use of Company accountsandauthorizationsregardingcash. However,itwasnotuntiloneyearlater,in June 2005, that the Company issued mandatory rules governing the use of business consultants, e.g. prohibiting success fees and requiring compliance officersto sign off on businessconsultingagreements. Whilethesemeasuresappeartohavebeenpartially effective, improper payments continued at least until the Dawn Raid in November 2006.

    27. Despite the V orstand’s knowledge of bribery at two of its largest groups – COM and PG – the Corporate Compliance Office continued to have a conflicted mandate andlackedresources. TherewasaninherentconflictintheCorporateComplianceOffice mandate, which included both defending the Company, and preventing compliance breaches. TheCorporateComplianceOfficewassignificantlyunderstaffed,withapart- timeChiefComplianceOfficer,anduptosixfuil-timelawyersuntil2007. Despite knowledge of numerous instances of corruption in multiple areas of the business, the Company did not implementmandatory FCPA compliancetraining until 2007.
    B. Illicit Payment Mechanisms Used to Pay Bribes

    28. During the Relevant Period, Siemens made thousands of payments to third partiesinwaysthatobscuredthepurposefor,andultimaterecipientof,themoney. The principal payment mechanisms used to facilitate illicit were business consultants, payment intermediaries, slush funds, cash, and intercompany accounts.

    29. Through its use of business consultants and payment intermediaries, Siemens funneled more than $982.7 million to third parties, including government officials. All but $27.5 million of the payments were made prior to November 15,2006. Business consultants were typically hired p u r s m t to business consultant agreements, contracts that on their face obligated Siemens to pay for legitimate consulting services. In reality, many business consultant agreements were shams in that the business consultant sperformednoservicesbeyondfunnelingbribes. PGhadspecificinstructions on how to use a “confidential payment systemytyo conceal payments to business consultants. Paymentintermediarieswereadditionalentitiesandindividualsthrough
    whichSiemensfunneledbribes. Inmanycases,Siemenswouldpaytheintermediaryan amount and simultaneously direct that the money be transferred to a third-party bank account, less a small portion as the intermediary’s fee.

    30. Siemens also funneled more than $211 million through slush funds for use asbribes. Allbut$2.3millionofthepiiymentsweremadepriortoSeptember30,2004. Slush funds were bank accounts held in the name of current or former senior Siemens employees,thirdparties,oraffiliatedentities. Themostnotableslushfundswere maintained by a former COM manager recently convicted in Germany for his role in the
    payment of bribes to foreign officials, which included several slush funds held in the name of U.S. shell companies.

    31.. Siemensalsousedcashandcashequivalentstoh e 1morethan$160.4 milliontothirdparties. Allbut$9.2millionofthepaymentsweremadepriorto September30,2004. SiemensCOMemployeesusedcashdesksmaintainedbythe SiemensRealEstateGrouptoobtainlargeamountsofcashtopaybribes. Often, employees would obtain hundreds of thousands of dollars and, at times, even $1 million invariouscurrenciesfiomthecashdesksinGermany. Thecashwastransported, sometimesinsuitcases,acrossinternationalbordersintovariouscountries. Attimes,the cash was then stored in safes maintained by Siemens employees to ensure ready access to cash to pay bribes.

    32. Lastly, Siemens used various types of internal accounts to funnel more than$16.2milliontothirdparties. Approximately99%ofthepaymentsweremadeprior toSeptember30,2005. AnintercompanyaccountisatypeofSiemens7internalaccount thatisusedtomakepaymentsontransactionsbetweentwoSiemensentities,i.e., for entitytoentitybusiness. Siemensusedtheintercompanyaccountstomakethirdparty payments and in a number of instances, Siemens maintained the accounts in the names of unconsolidated entities around the globe, including Ecuador and Nicaragua, in order to avoiddetection. Someoftheintercompanyaccountsmaintainedatunconsolidated entitieswereknownto, andpossiblycreatedby, aformermemberoftheVorstand, who
    had oversight responsibility for Latin America.
33. As early as 2004, a Siemens Corporate Finance Financial Audit employee
    raised concerns about the use of intercompany accounts. He was phased out of his job and assigned to work on “special projects” fkom his home until leaving the Company in 2005. Siemensthereafterbeganclosingsomeoftheaccountsandeventuallyclosedallof them.

    34. Another type of internal account that employees abused was Siemens MEDinternalcommissionaccounts. Thesebalance-sheetaccountswereintendedtobe usedtorecord commissionsMEDearnedontransactionswithotherSiemensentities. Theseaccountswereusedtomakethirdpartypayments. Manyoftheintercompany account payments and the MED internal commission account payments were done manually to bypass Siemens’ automated payment system. The manual payments, executed through SFS, did not require the submission of documentation in support of a payment.

    35. Siemens uied a host of other schemes to make more than $25.3 million in paymentstothirdparties. Inparticular,Siemensusedshamsupplieragreements, receivables and other write-offs to generate payments.
C. Breakdown of Third Partv Pavments

    36. During the Relevant Period, Siemens made 4,283 separate payments totaling approximately $1-4 billion to bribe government officials in foreign countries throughouttheworld. Anadditionalapproximately1,185separatepaymentstothird parties totaling approximately$39lmillionwere not properly controlledand were used, at least in part, for illicit purposes, including commercial bribery and embezzlement. The following chart breaks down the $1-4 billion in illicit payments to foreign government .. officials by business group.
    D. Bribery of Government Officials
37. The following paragraphs provide examples of bribery schemes involving
    projects and individual sales carried out by Siemens using U.S. means during the RelevantPeriodwithprofits,ofover$1.1 billion.
    1. Metro Transit Lines in Venezuela

    38. Between 2001 and 2007, Siemens TS and Siemens S.A., a regional company in Venezuela, paid an estimated $16.7 million in bribes to Venezuelan government officials in connection with the construction of metro transit systems in the
    ‘citiesofValenciaandMaracaibo,Venezuela. Thetwoprojects,MetroValenciaand MetroMaracaibo,generatedapproximately$642millioninrevenuetoSiemens. The Metro Valencia project was awarded to a TS entity in the United States and later transferred to Siemens, and the Metro Maracaibo project was awarded to Siemens and part of the work was assigned to the U.S.TSentity. Eachofthecontractswasfinanced inpartbytheU.S.Export-ImportBankinWashington,D.C. Thecorruptpaymentswere made using four separate, overlappingpayment schemes.

    39. Under the first scheme, Siemensmaintained a numbered, off-books bank account in Panama and either maintained a similar account in Miami or had contacts to a bankerinMiamiwhohadaccesstosuchaccounts. Theseaccountswerecontrolledby twoCEOsandtwoCFOsofSiemens’regionalsubsidiaryinVenezuela. Oneofthe regional CFOs estimated that between 2001 and 2003 he paid $5 to $6 million per year out of the accounts, a portion of which went to government officials in support of the Venezuelanprojects. TheregionalCFOperiodicallydestroyedtheaccountstatements.

    40. Under the second scheme, Siemens paid over $6.8 million to four U.S.- basedentitiescontrolledbyalongtimeSiemensbusinessconsultant. Siemenscalled upon the consultant, known as a political “fixer” in Venezuela and who had been an advisor to former V enezuelan presidents, to ensure political support for the Maracaibo andValenciaprojectsandforSiemens’roleinthem. Siemensmadepaymentsintothe U.S. bank accounts of the four controlled entities pursuant to sham consulting agreements inreturnfornolegitimatework. BankrecordsrevealpaymentstoVenezuelan govemment officials and politically-connected individuals, including a high-ranking member of the central government, two prominent Venezuelan attorneys acting on behalf of government officials, a former V enezuelan defense minister and diplomat, and a
    relative of a local politician, all of whom had influence over these and other Siemens contractsinVenezuela. Siemenstransferredanadditional$4.9milliontooneofthe
    controlled entities between 2006 and 2007 by artificially inflating the terms of a contract with a U.S. engineering firm.

    41. Under the third scheme, Siemens used a Cyprus-based business consultant as an intermediary to fund up to $2.5 million in bribe payments on the Valencia project. Sham agreements were entered into with the business consultant that purported to be for otherSiemensprojects,butwereactuallydesignedtotransfermoneytoValencia. This payment scheme was authorized by a former CFO of the Turnkey Division within the TS group at Siemens.

    42. Under the fourth scheme, Siemens in 2002 and 2003 entered into a sham agreement with a Dubai-based business consultant to supply Metro Maracaibo with approximately$2.6millioninworkshopequipment. Theequipmentwasactually supplied by another supplier, and the business consultant did not supply any goods under thecontract. Afterthebusinessconsultantcameundersuspicionasaresultofits involvement in the investigation of possible bribes paid to ENEL managers in Italy, the CFO of Siemens’ Turnkey Division’s successor was ordered to terminate the contract. Instead, the new CFO arranged the assignment of the contract to another Dubai-based business consultant that continued the sham workshop equipment arrangement.
    2. Metro Trains and Simaling:Devices in China

    43. Between 2002 and 2007, Siemens TS paid approximately $22 million to business consultants who used some portion of those funds to bribe foreign officials in connection with seven projects for the construction of metro trains and signaling devices on behalf of government customers in China. The total value of the projects was over $1 billion. AfterexperiencingdifficultybreakingintothemodernChinesemarket,Siemens
    began using a Hong-Kong based business consultant and related entities to pay bribes to influencetheawardofcontractstoSiemens. Siemenstypicallyhiredthebusiness consultant based on an oral agreement to pay a success fee equal to a percentage of the project value and would enter into a written business consulting agreement after the governmentcontractwasawardedtoSiemens. InconnectionwithoneShanghaiproject, four wholly-owned subsidiaries of the Hong Kong business consultant submitted invoices totaling $11.7 million to Siemens and requested payment routed through a U.S. correspondentbankandthentovariousSwissaccounti Theillicitarrangementwas entered into by a Sales & Marketing manager, who later became a Vice President of Siemens TS in China with the knowledge and approval of his supervisors. There were few, if any, legitimate services provided by the business consultant; backdated agreements and phony work product were used to support at least some of the payments. E-mails relating to a variety of projects indicate that the business consultant was funneling money to government officials and “friends” with inside information and influence over government contracting decisions.
    3. Power Plants in Israel

    44. Between 2002 and 2005, Siemens PG paid approximately $20 million in bribes to a former Director of the state-owned Israel Electric Company (“IEC”). The bribes were paid in connection with four contracts to build and service power plants in Israel. The total value of the contracts was approximately$786 million: Siemensrouted the corrupt payments through a business consultant owned and managed by the brother in-law of the CEO of Siemens Israel Limited,a regional subsidiary. The business consultant wasostensiblypaidto”identify anddefrnesalesopportunities,provide market intelligence,” and support contract negotiations. Inreality,thebusinessconsultantwasa Hong Kong-based clothing company with no expertise in the power generation industry. The business consultant never provided the services called for under its business consultant agreement.

    45. Some of the money paid to the business consultant was traced to the former IEC Director, who was in a position to influence the award of the contracts won by Siemens. A portion of the funds passed through U.S. bank accounts.
    4. Hieh -Voltaee TransmissionLines in China

    46. Between 2002 and 2003, Siemens PTD paid approximately $25 million in bribes to govenunent customers in connection with two for the installation of high voltage transmission lines in South China.. The total value of the projects was approximately$838million. Thepaymentswerefunneledthroughmultiple intermediaries, including a Dubai-based business consulting firm controlled b y , a former Siemens PTD employee and then paid to several entities associated with a Chinese business consultant who heldaU.SpassportandmaintainedaU.S.residence. Payments to the Dubai-based business consultant were supported by phony distribution contracts. Senior management of PTD in Germany approved the payments with the understanding that they would be shared with “partners” in China, including government officials. In 2002, Siemens used U.S. banks to funnel $1.2 million in bribes to another business consultantwhoseprincipalshareholdersheldU.S.passports. Thatbusinessconsultant also entered into a sham business consultant agreement with Siemens under which no legitimate services were provided.
    5. Mobile Telephone Services in Bangladesh

    47. Between 2004 and 2006, Siemens COM paid approximately $5.3 million in bribes to government officials in Bangladesh in connection with a contract with the Bangladesh Telegraph & Telephone Board (“BT’TB) to install mobile telephone services. The.totalvalueofthecontractwasapproximately$40.9million. Thepayments
    ‘were made to three business consultants pursuant to sham agreements calling for services associatedwiththemobiletelephoneproject. Theultimaterecipientsofthepayments included the son of the then-Prime Minister in Bangladesh, the Minister of the Ministry of Posts & Telecommunicationsin Bangladesh, and the BTTB Director of Procurement. In addition, Siemens Limited Bangladesh, a regional company, hired relatives.of two otherBTTBandMinistryofPostandTelecomofficials. Mostofthemoneypaidtothe business consultants waS routed through correspondent accounts in the United States, with at least one payment originating &om a U.S. account. Since approximately September 2004, a Siemens business consultant who served as a principal payment intermediary on the Bangladesh bribe payments has been resident in the United States. At least $1.7 million of the bribe payments made through this intermediary were paid into a Hong Kong bank account while the intermediary was residing in the United States.

    48. The involvement of senior officials at Siemens’ regional company in Bangladesh, including a former CEO and the director of the regional company’s COM division, in the bribery scheme is revealed both in statements by the officials and in internal email messages, several of which include the tagline, “kindly delete this mail once the purpose is done.”
    6. Four TelecommunicationsProiects in Nigeria

    49. Siemens COM made approximately $12.7 million in suspicious payments in connection with Nigerian projects, with at least $4.5 million paid as bribes in connection with four telecommunications projects with government customers in Nigeria, including Nigeria TelecommunicationsLimited and the Ministry of Communications. Thetotalvalueofthefourcontractswasapproximately$130million. Thepracticeof payingbribesbySiemensCOMinNigeriawaslong-standingandsystematic. According to a high ranking official within Siemens Limited Nigeria, a regional company, corrupt payments in 2000 and 2001 commonly reached 15 to 30% of the contracts’ value. Bribe payments were typically documented using fictitious business consultant agreements underwhichnoactualserviceswereperformed. TheCEOofSiemensLimitedNigeria forwardedrequestsfor”commission” paymentstoSiemensheadquartersinGermany. The illicit payments were then made through a number of means, frequently including large cash withdrawals from cash desks that were then hand-carried in suitcasesto
    Nigeria.
50. In the four telecommunicationsprojects, approximately$2.8 million of the bribe payments was routed through a bank account in Potomac, Maryland, in the ,pameof the wife of a former Nigerian Vice President. The Vice President’s wife, a dual U.S.- Nigerian citizen living in the United States, served as the representative of a business consultant that entered into fictitious business consultant agreements to perform “supply, installation, and commissioning” services but did no actual work for Siemens. The purpose of these payments was to bribe government officials. Other compt payments included the purchase of approximately $172,000 in watches for Nigerian officials designated in internal Siemens records as “P.” and “V.P.,” likely referring to the President and Vice-President of Nigeria.
    7. Identitv card Proiectin Argentina

    51. Between 1998and 2004, Siemenspaid over $40 million in bribes to senior officials of the government of Argentina in an effort to secure a $1 billion project to producenationalidentitycards. Siemensofficialsbetween1998and1999,includingthe then-CEO of Siemens regional company in Argentina, Siemens S.A., caused $19 million tobepaidtobusinessconsultantsforbribes. Atleast$2.6millionwastransferredfrom the business consultants’ accounts directly to the President of Argentina, the Minister of theInterior,andtheHeadofImmigrationControltoobtainthecontract. Duringthis period, Siemens officials promised to pay an additional $30 million or more to the PresidentandhisCabinetministers. Inlate1999,theArgentinePresidentendedhisterm when his party was voted out of office, and the new administrationthreatened to terminatethecontractonthegroundthatithadbeenprocuredbyfiaud. Inaneffortto head off that possibility, Siemens paid $6 million in additional bribes to officials in the new Argentine administration. Despite these payments, the contract was nonetheless canceled in May 2001.

    52. Over the following four years, Siemens officials received a series of payment demands and threats against its employees in Argentina if it did not fulfill its pastcommitmenttopayadditionalbribes. Between2002and2004,Siemenspaidover $23milliontosettlethesedemands. TheSiemensofficialsinvolvedinauthorizingthe payments included a member of the V orstand, who in 2003 personally flew to the United States to meet with Siemens’ principal intermediary to negotiate the payment terms, as
    well as the CEO and CFO of Siemens’ regional company in Argentina. Approximately $9.5 million of these payments were routed through the books of an unrelated PTD transmission project in China in an effort to conceal the payments fiom Siemens’ internal auditors. other were made through^.^. bank accounts based on fictitious invoices for non-existent past services in connection with the identity card project and other projects in the region, including payments to a former government Minister and member of the Argentine Congress.
    8. Medical Devices in Vietnam

    53. Siemens MED paid $183,000 in early 2005 and $200,000 in early 2006 in connection with the sale of approximately $6 million of medical devices on two projects involvingtheVietnameseMinistryofHealth. Afterlearningthatbribepaymentswere required in Vietnam, Siemens MED sought the name of the business consultant entrusted by Siemens TS to conduct business in that market, including making its bribe payments. Siemens MED then entered into an agreement with an affiliate of the group of Hong- Kong based business consultants used by Siemens TS to act as Siemens MEDY ps ayment intermediary. ThepaymentswereroutedthroughaU.S. correspondentbankandthento Singapore bank accounts of t h e ‘ ~ o no~n^ business consultant. The amounts were then withdrawniricashandtransportedtoVietnam. Projectcalculationsheetsconnectedto the sales desdribe the payments to the intermediary as relating to “room preparation.” A number of Siemens senior managers, including the then-CFO of Siemens7business in Vietnam, admitted that the purpose of the payments was to bribe government officials.

    54. With regard to the $183,000 payment that was made in early 2005, the formerCFOofSiemensLimitedVietnam(“SLV”) describedhowheandthethenCEO
    of Siemens SLV picked up an envelope with $183,000 cash at a hotel in Singapore “fi-om a Hong Kong business man” and flew to the Hanoi airport where the money was left with the then-head of Siemens MED in Vietnam, who had primary responsibility for contract negotiations with officials at the Vietnamese Ministry of Health.
    9. Medical Devices in China

    55. Between 2003 and 2007, Siemens MED paid approximately $14.4 million in bribes to the same intermediary described above in connection with $295 million in sales of medical equipment to five Chinese-owned hospitals, as well as to fund lavish tripsforChinesedoctors. TheformercontrollerofSiemensoversawthebusiness relationship between Siemens and the affiliate of the Hong-Kong-based intermediary that itusedtopaythebribes. Amajorityofthesalesonwhichtheintermediaryreceiveda paymentinvolvedabribetoagovernmentofficial. Thesameintermediarywasusedby Siemens TS to pay bribes in China and by Siemens MED to pay bribes in Vietnam.

    56. For example, Siemens paid $64,800 in May 2006 in connection with the sale of a $1.5 million MRI system to the Songyuan City Central Hospital in China. The payment was sent to a U.S. bank account, and later routed to a Singapore bank account in the name of the intermediary. A project calculation sheet signed by the then-CFO of Siemens MED China described the payment as relating to “expenses (commission)”; however, no services were provided by the intermediary aside from acting as a vehicle forthetransferofbribepayments. InoraroundMarch2008,SongyuanHospital’s deputy director and head of the radiology department was convicted in China of corruption charges, including a charge for accepting a $60,000 bribe from a
    .
    Siemens salesperson in connection with the sale of the MRI system and sentenced to fourteen years in prison.

    57. Siemens also used the Hong Kong intermediary to pay $9 million in travel costs for “study trips” M e n by doctors who worked at government-owned hospitals in China. Thestudytrips,whichincludedlavishtripstoLasVegas,Miami,andother vacation spots in the United States, were connected to at least 231 separate sales to hospitalsawardedtoSiemenswithrevenueofapproximately$235million. Theformer CFO of Siemens MED in China used the intermediary to pay for study trips because of concerns about the lavishness and “non-scientific content” of the trips, which were taken by doctorswhowereinapositiontoawardbusinesstoSiemens.
    58. Bribes were also paid to secure sales of medical equipment to hospitals in China on behalf of two Siemens U.S.-based subsidiaries, Oncology Care Solutions (“OCS”) inCaliforniaandMolecularImaging(“MI”) inIllinois. ForOCS,Siemens developed a scheme to minimize the risk of anti-bribery prosecution in the United States for these transactions by routing the approval of business consulting agreements and the
    payment of business consultants through Siemens’ headquarters in Germany rather than intheUnitedStates. Between1998and2004,thisschemewasusedtoapproveimproper payments of approximately $650,000 to Chinese business consultants in connection with the U.S.-related sales. A senior manager at Siemens MED in Germany and officials of theU.S.-based subsidiaries,includingtheCFOsofOCSandMIwereawareofthe business consultant payments and facilitated the scheme by verifying the amounts to be paidandthatthepaymentsweredueandowing. Atonepointafterapprovingtwenty-six such payments, the senior manager at Siemens MED refbsed to continue the payment
    scheme,citingconcernforthewelfareofhisfamilyifheweresenttoprison. TheCFO of MED attempted to pressure the senior manager to keep the payment scheme going, but without success.
    59. In 2005, these officialsalso verified that “clean up” payments totaling over $500,000 were owed to Siemens’ Hong Kong-based intermediary in connection with salesbyOCSandMIinChina. Theoutstandingpaymentswereforbribesowedtothird partiesonbehalfofSiemens. AfterreceivingconfiationfromOCSandMIthatthe payments were outstanding, the former controller of Siemens Med authorized three “clean up” payments in 2005 for $377,400, $140,000 and $44,000.
    10. Traffic Control Svstem in Russia
    60. From 2004 to 2006, Siemens I&S and 0 0 0 Siemens, a regional company in Russia, paid approximately $741,419 in bribes to government officials in connection with a World Bank-funded project for the design and installation of a $27 million traffic controlsysteminMoscowcgedtheMoscowThirdRingProject. First,Siemenspaid money to its business consultant who simultaneously worked as a technical consultant for theMoscowProjectImplementationUnit(the”MPIU”), aquasi-governmentalunitthat rantheMoscowThirdRingproject. TheMPIUhiredthetechnicalconsultantat Siemens’ suggestion. From 2004 to 2006, Siemens paid approximately $313,000 to three entities associated with the technical consultant, with at least $141,419 of the payment in exchangeforfavorabletreatmentinthetenderingprocess. Thetechnicalconsultantused hispositionattheMPIUtocreatetenderspecificationsfavorableto Siemens,toprovide tender documents to Siemens before their official publication, to evaluate project bids in
    .
    a way that ensured Siemens would win the contract, and to assist during the implementation phase of the project.
    61. Second, Siemens colluded with a competitor who agreed to inflate its project bid to ensure Siemens won the project. In return, Siemens hired the competitor at aninflatedrateofapproximately$800,000. Siemensalsohiredtwoofthecompetitor’s former consortium members to become subcontractors to Siemens on the project (“SubcontractorAandSubcontractorB). SiemenspaidSubcontractorAapproximately $1.3 million for a sham traffic study and approximately $1.4 million to SubcontractorB for other alleged services. In fact, both subcontractors were used to funnel at least $600,000 of the $741,419 described in paragraph 60 to senior officials of the MPN.
    11. Refinerv Modernization Proiect in Mexico
    62. In late 2004, Siemens PG and Siemens S.A. de CV, a regional entity, made three separate.illicit payments totaling approximately $2.6 million to a politically- connected business consultant to assist in settling cost overrun claims in connection with threerefmerymodernizationprojectsinMexico. Someportionofthesepaymentswere routed through the business consultant to a senior official of the Mexican state-owned petroleum company, Petroleos Mexicanos (Ternex”). The official was in a position to influencetbesettlement. Thepaymentsweremadewiththeknowledgeandapprovalof the then-CEO of Siemens’ regional company in Mexico. The payments w& supported . by invoices reflecting consulting services that were not provided or only vaguely described. A portion of Siemens’ work on the contracts was performed by a regional subsidiary in Atlanta, and some of the contract financing was provided by the U.S. Export-Import Bank in Washington, DC.
    12. Medical Devices in Russia

    63. Between 2000 and 2007, Siemens MED made improper payments of over $55 million to a Dubai-based business consultant in connection with sales of medical equipmentinRussia. ThebusinessconsuItantwasusedasapaymentintermediaryfor bribestogovernment-ownedcustomersinRussia. TheformerCFOofSiemensMED knewofandapprovedthepayments. SeniorSiemensofficialsestimatedthatupto80% ofSiemens’MEDbusinessinRussiainvolvedillicitpayments. Ononesuchtransaction in 2006, siemens made payments of approximately $287,914, some of which was used for bribes, in connection with the $2.5 million sale of a computer tomograph system to a publichospitalinEkaterinburg. Onthiscontract,thebribeswereroutedthroughthe Dubai-based business consultant, as well as a second business consultant that was registered in Des Moines, Iowa.
    13. GSM Mobile Network Services in Vietnam

    64. In 2002, Siemens COM paid approximately $140,000 in bribes in connection with a tender worth approximately $35 million for the supply of equipment and services related to a Global Systems mobile network for Vietel, a government owned telecommunicationsproviderfoundedbytheVietnameseMinistryofDefense. Two separate payments totaling $140,000 were made to the Singapore account of a Siemens businessconsultant. ThepaymentswerethenroutedthroughaU.S. correspondent accountandlikelypaidtoofficialsattheVietnameseMinistryofDefense. Thepayments were part of a much larger bribery scheme concocted by high-level managers at Siemens regional company in Vietnam, SLV, to pay bribes to government officials at Vietel and the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense in order to acquire Phase I of the Vietel GSM tender.
    In a June 2002, facsimile that discussed the bribery scheme, the former head of COM sales for the regional company described Siemens’ explicit agreement to pay 8% of the value of the Vietel project to officials at the Ministry of Defense and 14%of the project valuetoofficialsatVietel. InAugustandSeptember2002,Siemenssignedagreements with two business consultants who were retained for the sole purpose of funneling the bribestogovernmentofficialsconnectedtoVietel. Ultimately,Siemenswas unsuccessful in its pursuit of the Vietel project and lost the tender before paying additional bribes.
    E. The Oil for Food Program

    65. The Oil for Food Program was intended to provide humanitarian relief for the Iraqi population, which faced severe hardship under the international trade sanctions thatfollowedIraq’s 1990invasionofKuwait. TheProgrampermittedtheIraqi governmentto sell its crude oil and use the proceeds to purchase food, medicine, and criticalidiastructuresupplies. Theproceedsoftheoilsalesweretransferreddirectly fiomthebuyerstoanescrowaccount(the”U.N. EscrowAccount”) maintainedinNew York by the United Nations 661 Committee. Funds in the U.N. Escrow Account were available for the purchase of humanitarian supplies, subject to U.N. approval and supervision. TheintentofthisstructurewastopreventtheproceedsofIraq’s crudeoil sales fiom undermining the sanctions regime by supplying cash to Saddam Hussein.

    66. CorruptionwasrampantwithintheProgram. Bymid-2000,Iraqi ministries on the instruction of top government officials instituted a policy requiring suppliersofhumanitariangoodstopayatenpercentkickbackoneachcontract. This kickback requirement was euphemisticallyreferred to as an “after-sales service” fee (“ASSF”); however,lioserviceswereprovided. Supplierscompetingtoobtaincontracts under the Program were encouraged to include a ten percent markup in their bids or purchaseorders. TheinflatedcontractpriceswereincorporatedintotheOilforFood contracts as a way to permit the suppliers to recover fiom the U.N. Escrow Account the kickback payments they had paid secretly to Iraq. Following the 2004 release of a report by the U.S. General Accounting Office exposing some of the abuses, the U.N. commissioned an independent inquiry committee, headed by former Federal Reserve ChairmanPaul Volcker (the “Volcker Committee”), to investigatethe Program’s performance. That committee’s October 27,2005, final report estimated that the Iraqi government had diverted $1-7 billion in illicit income fiom the Program.
    1. Siemens’ Involvement in the Oil for Food Program

    67. Siemens participated in the Program through two of its regional companies, Siemens S.A.S. (“Siemens France”) and Siemens Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. (“Siemens Turkey”) and two subsidiaries, Osram Middle East FZE (“Osram ME”) and Gas Turbine Technologies SpA ( ” G T ) . In total, 42 Oil for Food contracts were entered into, and secret kickback payments of approximately $1.7 million were made to Iraqi controlledaccountsinordertoavoiddetectionbytheU.N. Totalrevenuesonthe contracts were over $124million with profit sofapproximately$38,226,537. The payments were characterized as after sales service fees; however, no services were actuallyrendered. TheASSFswereeffectivelybribespaidtotheIraqiregime,which Siemens improperly disguised on its books and records by rnischaracterizing the bribes as legitimate commissions.
    2. Siemens France

    68. From approximately September 2000 to July 2001, Siemens France entered into twelve contracts covering power station renovation, servicing and spare parts with the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity and paid illicit ASSFs of approximately $321,745. The contracts were artificially inflated by 10% and then submitted to the U.N. for payment. The U.N. was not informed that the contracts had been inflated or that Siemens France intended to pay illicit kickbacks to Iraq.

    69. For instance, in July 2000 Siemens submitted a bid for the rehbishment
    ofcranesattheDauraPowerStationinIraq. Thepurchaseorderwassubsequently
    signedinNovember2000,andincludeda10%increaseinthecontractvalue. Shortly
    thereafter, in January 2001, Siemens signed a Supplement to its business consultant agreement with its local agent in Iraq providing for a 10% commission to the agent for “after sales services and activities.” The document was unusual because it provided a
    ..
    higher agent compensationthanwas usually provided on such contracts; it was “inconsistent with Siemens’ practice” which required specification and pricing of any true after sales services; and because there was only one Siemens signatory on the contract. Invariouslettersandmemoranda,oneformerSiemenssalesmandocumented discussionsthathehadwithIraqiofficialsregardingtherequirementofASSFs. Ina memorandum written by another Siemens employee discussing how to make the ASSF payments, the employee stated that Siemens’ agent in Iraq told him that another Siemens subsidiary, Siemens Turkey, had chosen to pay ASSFs in cash “so that no names appear on paper.”

    70. Siemens France used a local agent in Iraq to deposit the ASSF payments in cash into a Jordanian bank account held by two Iraqi officials, which were later transferredtoanaccountcontrolledbytheIraqiMinistryofElectricity. Thelocalagent confirmed the bank deposits were made on behalf of Siemens and bank records reflect the payments. WhenmakingtheASSFpayments,thelocalagentusedthenameofan acquaintance who did not work for Siemens so as to conceal his true identity.
    3. Siemens Turkev
71. From approximately September 2000 to June 2002, Siemens Turkey
    entered into twenty contracts relating to the building and rehabilitation of power stations, andpaidaftersalesservicefeestotalingapproximately$1,243,119. Manyaspectsof Siemens Turkey’s involvement in the Oil for Food Program were similar to those of SiemensFrance. BothcompaniesusedthesamelocalagentinIraqandbothdealt principallywiththeMinistryofElectricityintheirpaymentofillicitASSFs. As described above, a Siemens employee stated’that the agent informed him that Siemens Turkey was paying ASSFs in cash “so that no names appear on paper.” Siemens’ local agent also deposited some ASSFs into a Jordanian bank account controlled by Iraqi officials.
    4. Osram Middle East

    72. From approximately May 2000 to June 2002, Osram Middle East (“Osram”), aSiemenssubsidiary,enteredintosixcontractswithstatecompanieswithin the Ministry of Oil, and paid ASSFs of approximately $89,250 for the sale of lighting equipment. Osram employees admitted that Siemens’ local agent relayed the Ministry of Oil’s demand for ASSFs sometime in late 2000. On three of the contracts, Osram entered
    intosecretsideagreementsagreeingtopaya10%kickbacktotheIraqiministry. The local agent signed each of the side letters on Osram’s behalf. The contracts between OsramandtheMinistryofOiltypicallycontaineda10%markupforASSFs. The inflated contracts were submitted to the U.N. for approval, but the U.N. was not informed that the contracts were inflated and the side letters were not disclosed. The agent admitted that he made the ASSF payments to Jordanian bank accounts held for the benefit of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil on Osram’s behalf.
    -GTT
73. Beginning in 2001, GTT entered into four contracts with the Ministry of Electricity in which ASSFs of $81,962 were paid. For each contract, the value of the
    contract was increased by approximately 10%between the submission of the initial bid andthesigningofthepurchaseorder. GTTemployeesadmittotheASSFkickback scheme,anddocumentsreflectthatGTT’s agentinIraqinformedGITthatASSF payments were a condition to obtaining contracts. Though all of the contracts were signed before 2003, none were performed before the start of the Iraqi war. After the war began, the U.N asked GTT to amend each contract to decrease its value by the 10% ASSF.
    P. Siemens Em~IovedU.S. Means to Engage in Bribery
74. In total, Siemens made bribe payments directly or indirectly to foreign
    govemment officials in connection with at least 290 projects or individual sales involving business in Venezuela, China, Israel, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Argentina, Vietnam, Russia, and Mexico that employed the mails and other means and instnunentalities of U.S. interstatecommerce. Thecorruptpaymentsweremadetogovernmentofficialsortheir
    5-
    designees for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business in connection to the above projects. Theuseofinterstatecommerceinconnectionwithbriberyincludedinvolving U.S.-based Siemenssubsidiariesandtheiremployeesinthebriberyschemes;financingof three underlying projects by the World Bank and the U.S. Export-Import Bank; making illegalpaymentsthroughU.S. banks;usingU-S-basedcompaniesasintermediaries, business consultants, and holders of slush funds; conducting meetings in the United States in furtherance of a bribery scheme; and transmitting mail, electronic mail, and facsimile messages into and out of the United States.
    G . Siemens Failed to Maintain Its Books and Records
75. During the Relevant Period, Siemens made thousands of payments to third
    parties in ways that obscured the purpose for, and the ultimate recipients of, the payments. In particular,Siemens paid approximately $1.4 billion in bribestoforeign government officials. DoingsoinvolvedthefalsificationofSiemens’booksandrecords byemployeesthroughouttheCompany. Specifically,Siemensfailedtokeepaccurate booksandrecordsby: 1)establishingandfundingsecret,off-booksaccounts; 2) establishing and using a system of payment intermediaries to obscure the source and destination’offunds; 3) making payments pursuant to business consultant agreements that inaccuratelydescribedtheservicesprovided;4)generatingfalseinvoicesandotherfalse documents to justify payments; 5) disbursing millions in cash from cash desks with inaccurate documentation authorizing or supporting the withdrawals; 6) using post-it notes for the purpose of concealing the identity of persons authorizing illicit payments;
7) recording illicit ASSF payments as legitimate commissions in Oil for Food
    transactions; 8) falsifymg U.N. documents in connection with the Oil for Food Program; and 9) recording bribes as payment for legitimate services.
H. Siemens Failed to Maintain Adequate Internal Controls

    76. Siemens failed to implement adequate internal controls to comply with the Company’s NYSE listing, including the detection and prevention of violations of the FCPA. First,Siemensengagedintheknowingfalsificationofbooksandrecords. Siemens established numerous off-books accounts and secret slush funds for the purpose ofobscuringthepurposefor,andultimaterecipientof,illicitpayments. Elaborate payment mechanisms were used to conceal the fact that bribe payments were made around the globe to obtain business, including the PG confidential payment system and extensiveuseofbusinessconsultantsandintermediariestoh e 1bribes. Falseinvoices and payment documentation was created to make payments to business consultants under false business consultant agreements that identified services that were never intended to berendered. Illicitpaymentswerefalselyrecordedasexpensesformanagementfees, consultingfees,supplycontracts,roompreparationfees,andcommissions. Documents relatedtoitsparticipationintheOilforFoodProgramwerealsoinaccurate. Siemens inflated U.N. contracts, signed side agreements w i 6 Iraqi ministries that were not disclosedtotheU.N., andrecordedtheASSFpaymentsaslegitimatecommissions despite U.N., US., and international sanctions against such payments.
    77. Second, Siemens employees routinely circumvented the internal controls theCompanyhadinplace. Slushfundswereopenedinthenamesofformerandcurrent employeesandmaintainedoff-books. Atanygivenpoint, Siemenshadnocentralrecord of the true number of bank accounts opened on its’behalf, from which, millions in illicit payments were made. Despitea”four-eyes” policy that requiredtwosignatureson Company documents to authorize transactions, a significant number of business consultant agreements were entered into and a significant number of payments were authorizedinviolationofthepolicy. Inmanyinstances,signaturesauthorizingthe withdrawal of hundreds of thousands of dollars from cash desks were placed on post-it notesandlaterremovedinordertoeradicateanypermanentrecordoftheapprovals. In numerous instances, officials signing documents failed to conduct any review of the documents. Forexample,anofficialwhoauthorizedpaymentsonbehalfofSiemens’ Russian regional subsidiary authorized payments despite his inability to read the language in which the supporting documentation of the payments were prepared. Siemens officials fiequently misused internal accounts by transferring money &om one Siemens entity to mother without any legitimate business purpose or proper documentation of the disposition of the funds. Siemens officialsmodifiedtheformatof agreements to avoid internal controls on the use of business consultants by backdating agreements, misidentifjingcounterparties as “agents” rather than “business consultants,” and obscuring the amounts paid to business consultants by splitting the payments among separate agreements.

    78. Finally, Siemens failed to establish adequate internal controls despite its knowledgethatcorruptionwasrampant. Siemensdidnotissuemandatoryand comprehensiveCompany-widecontrolsregardingtheuseofbusinessconsultantsuntil June 2005, well after senior officials were aware of widespread bribery in the Company’s twolargestdivisions,COMandPG. Despitethosecontrols,duediligenceonbusiness consultants remained largely inadequate, and payments continued to be made without
    adequateproofofservicesrendered. Siemensfailedtoestablishcontrolsovernumerous off-booksaccountsheldonitsbehalfaroundtheworld. TheCompanymaintainedno central list of corporate accounts held at unconsolidated entities or in the names of individualSiemensofficials. Siemensfailedtoestablishcontrolsovercash disbursements, allowed manual payments without documentation, and failed to ensure the properuseof intercompanyaccounts. Siemensfailedtoestablishaneffectivecentral compliancefunction. Thecomplianceofficelackedindependenceandwasseverely understaffed. Siemenstoneatthetopwasinadequateforalawabidingentity,and employees engaged in bribery and other misconduct on behalf of the Company were not adequatelydisciplined. Siemensalsofailedtoconductappropriateanti-briberyand corruption training.
    CLAWIS FOR RELIEF
FIRST CLAIM
[Violations of Section 30A of the Exchange Act]
    Paragraphs 1 through 78 are realleged and incorporated by reference.

    79. As described above, Siemens, through its officers, agents, and subsidiaries, corruptly offered, promised to pay, or authorized payments to one or more persons, while knowing that al or a portion of those payments would be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to foreign officials for the purpose of influencing their acts or decisions in their official capacity, inducing them to do or omit to do actions in violation of their official duties, securing an improper advantage, or inducing such foreign officials to use their influence with foreign governments or instrumentalities thereof to assist Siemens in obtaining or retaining business.

    80. By reason of the foregoing, Siemens violated, and unless enjoined will continuetoviolate,Section30AoftheExchangeAct. [15U.S.C. S78dd-11
    SECOND CLAIM
[Violations of Section 13@)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act]
    Paragraphs 1 through 80 are realleged and incorporated by reference.

    81. As described above, Siemens, through its officers, agents and subsidiaries, failed to keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflected its transactions and dispositions of its assets.

    82. By reason of the foregoing, Siemens violated, and unless enjoined wil continuetoviolate,Section13(b)(2)(A)oftheExchangeAct. [15U.S.C.
    §78m~(2)(~)1
    THIRD CLAIM
[Violations of Section 13@)(2)@) of the Exchange Act]
    Paragraphs 1 through 82 are realleged and incorporated by reference.

    83. As described above, Siemens failed to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that:
(i) transactions were executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; and (ii) transactions were recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for its assets.

    https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20829.pdf

  2. The Inquiry’s verdict on the Siemens scandal in Greece
    Source: http://www.protothema.gr/politics/article/?aid=101972

    Published by: chek-93 on Apr 21, 2013

  3. ΑΛΛΑ ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ

    Μηνυτήρια αναφορά Νικολόπουλου για χρηματισμό Υπουργών του ΠΑΣΟΚ και της ΝΔ
    https://justiceforgreece.wordpress.com/μηνύσεις-2/μηνυτήρια-αναφορά-νικολόπουλου-για-χ/

    Κρίθηκε προφυλακιστέος ο πρώην αναπληρωτής γενικός διευθυντής εξοπλισμών με τα 13,7 εκατ. δολάρια
    https://justiceforgreece.wordpress.com/2013/12/19/κρίθηκε-προφυλακιστέος-ο-πρώην-αναπλ/

    SOS για την υπόθεση της Siemens – Ιούλιος 05 2016
    “Καμπανάκι” για το μέλλον μίας από τις σημαντικότερες δίκες της ελληνικής ιστορίας, αυτής για τα “μαύρα ταμεία” της Siemens, χτύπησε ο εισαγγελέας του Τριμελούς Εφετείου Κακουργημάτων, Χαράλαμπος Τζώνης, υπογραμμίζοντας ότι ήδη τα αδικήματα έχουν ξεκινήσει να παραγράφονται.
    http://news247.gr/eidiseis/koinonia/eglima/sos-gia-thn-ypothesh-ths-siemens.4155011.html

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