Αγγλικά :
Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement, MFFA as amended by the Amendment Agreement dated 12 December 2012, THE THIRD AMENDMENT AGREEMENT (27 February 2015)
ΤΑ ΦΕΚ
Ενισχυμένα μέτρα εποπτείας και εξυγίανσης των πιστωτικών ιδρυμάτων – Ρύθμιση θεμάτων χρηματοπιστωτικού χαρακτήρα – Κύρωση της Σύμβασης – Πλαίσιο του Ευρωπαϊκού Ταμείου Χρηματοπιστωτικής Σταθερότητας και των τροποποιήσεών της και άλλες διατάξεις. [Ειδικό Τέλος Ακινήτων]
ΜΕΡΟΣ ΤΕΤΑΡΤΟ
ΚΥΡΩΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΣΥΜΒΑΣΗΣ – ΠΛΑΙΣΙΟ ΤΟΥ ΕΤΧΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΤΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΗΣΕΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΣΥΜΒΑΣΗΣ – ΠΛΑΙΣΙΟ ΤΟΥ ΕΤΧΣ
Αρθρο 48.
Αρθρο 49.
Αρθρο 50. Τροποποιήσεις του ν. 3864/2010
Αρθρο 51. Λήξη θητείας μελών ΕΛΣΤΑΤ
Αρθρο 52. Τροποποιήσεις του ν. 4002/2011
Αρθρο 53. Έκτακτο Ειδικό Τέλος Ηλεκτροδοτούμενων Δομημένων Επιφανειών (Ε.Ε.Τ.Η.Δ.Ε.)
Αρθρο 54. Έναρξη ισχύος
AMENDMENT TO THE EFSF FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT
H Κύρια Σύμβαση Χρηματοδοτικής Διευκόλυνσης
Διευκρινίσεις:
“Ευρωπαϊκό Μηχανισμό Σταθερότητας” («ΕΤΧΣ») = ανώνυμη εταιρεία με έδρα στο Λουξεμβούργο (RCS Λουξεμβούργο B153.414),
Το Ελληνικο Ταμείο Χρηματοπιστωτικής Σταθερότητας ιδρύθηκε τον Ιούλιο του 2010 (Ν. 3864/2010 ΦΕΚ Α’119/21.7.2010 ) ως νομικό πρόσωπο ιδιωτικού δικαίου, το οποίο δεν ανήκει στο δημόσιο τομέα, διαθέτει διοικητική και οικονομική αυτοτέλεια, λειτουργεί αμιγώς κατά τους κανόνες της ιδιωτικής οικονομίας και διέπεται από τις διατάξεις του ιδρυτικού νόμου όπως ισχύει. Όλως συμπληρωματικά εφαρμόζονται οι διατάξεις του κ.ν. 2190/1920, όπως εκάστοτε ισχύει, εφόσον δεν είναι αντίθετες προς τις διατάξεις και τους στόχους του ιδρυτικού του νόμου. Ο αμιγώς ιδιωτικός χαρακτήρας του Ταμείου δεν αναιρείται ούτε από την κάλυψη του συνόλου του κεφαλαίου του από το Ελληνικό Δημόσιο, ούτε από την έκδοση των προβλεπόμενων αποφάσεων του Υπουργού Οικονομικών.
Δημοσίευση ΠΝΠ ΦΕΚ 55/Α/2012
Υπογράφουν: ΠΑΠΑΔΗΜΟΣ, πρόεδρος υπουργικού συμβουλίου, ΠΑΓΚΑΛΟΣ, ΒΕΝΙΖΕΛΟΣ, ΡΕΠΠΑΣ, ΓΙΑΝΝΙΤΣΗΣ, ΔΗΜΑΣ, ΑΒΡΑΜΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, ΠΑΠΑΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΥ, ΜΠΑΜΠΙΝΙΩΤΗΣ, ΒΟΡΙΔΗΣ, ΣΚΑΝΔΑΛΙΔΗΣ, ΠΑΠΑΪΩΑΝΝΟΥ, ΧΡΥΣΟΧΟΪΔΗΣ, ΓΕΡΟΥΛΑΝΟΣ, ΣΤΑΥΡΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, ΚΑΨΗΣ, ΓΕΝΝΗΜΑΤΑ, ΣΑΧΙΝΙΔΗΣ, ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, ΞΥΝΙΔΗΣ, ΣΗΦΟΥΝΑΚΗΣ, ΑΡΒΑΝΙΤΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, μέλη
14/03/2012: Κατάθεση στη Βουλή
20/03/2012: Κύρωση, ν. 4060 ΦΕΚ 65/Α/22.03.2013 ( 132 σελίδες)
2) Η πρώτη τροποποίηση
ΠΡΑΞΗ ΝΟΜΟΘΕΤΙΚΟΥ ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΥ
Έγκριση των Σχεδίων των Συμβάσεων Τροποποίησης της Κύριας Σύμβασης Χρηματοδοτικής Διευκόλυνσης μετα− ξύ του Ευρωπαϊκού Ταμείου Χρηματοπιστωτικής Στα− θερότητας (Ε.Τ.Χ.Σ.), της Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας, του Ελληνικού Ταμείου Χρηματοπιστωτικής Σταθερότητας (Τ.Χ.Σ.) και της Τράπεζας της Ελλάδος (ΤτΕ), με τίτλο «Κύρια Σύμβαση Χρηματοδοτικής Διευκόλυνσης», της Σύμβασης Χρηματοδοτικής Διευκόλυνσης μεταξύ του Ε.Τ.Χ.Σ., της Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας και της ΤτΕ, με τίτ− λο «Σύμβαση Διευκόλυνσης Διαχείρισης Υποχρεώσεων ΣΙΤ» και της Σύμβασης Χρηματοδοτικής Διευκόλυνσης μεταξύ του Ε.Τ.Χ.Σ., της Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας και της ΤτΕ, με τίτλο «Διευκόλυνση αποπληρωμής Τόκων Ομο− λόγων», παροχή εξουσιοδοτήσεων για την υπογραφή των Συμβάσεων και άλλες επείγουσες διατάξεις.
Δημοσίευση ΦΕΚ 240Α/12-12-2012
Αντιδράσεις
– Αιτήσεις περί Εφαρμογής της υπ’ αριθ. 4 / 2012 Εγκύκλιου του Εισαγγελέα του Αρείου Πάγου, για την σύλληψη των βουλευτών που θα υπέγραφαν την άνευ όρων παράδοση της χώρας στους δανειστές με την κύρωση της ΠΝΠ. ( περισσότερες αντιδράσεις στα σχόλια αυτής της ανάρτησης )
– Ο Γιώργος Κασιμάτης για την ψηφοφορία της 14ης Ιανουαρίου 2013
– ΖΩΗ ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ – ΒΟΥΛΗ (14/01/2013)
Ομιλία Ζωής Κωνσταντοπούλου, βουλευτή του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ-ΕΚΜ, επί της ενστάσεως αντισυνταγματικότητας του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ-ΕΚΜ στο νομοσχέδιο του Υπουργείου Οικονομικών για την κύρωση και την ενσωμάτωση σε κατεπείγον νομοσχέδιο πράξεων νομοθετικού περιεχομένου (14/01/2013)
Κύρωση
Βουλή νομοσχέδιο, τροπολογίες, συζητήσεις κλπ
Title
Pension provisions, amendments of law 4093/2012, ratification of the Act of Legislative Content «Approval of the Draft Agreements Amending the Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement between the European Financial Stability Facility (E.F.S.F.), the Hellenic Republic, the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (H.F.S.F.) and the Bank of Greece, under the title “Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement”, of the Financial Assistance Facility Agreement between the European Financial Stability Facility (E.F.S.F.), the Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece, under the title “PSI LM Facility Agreement” and of the Financial Assistance Facility Agreement between the European Financial Stability Facility (E.F.S.F.), the Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece, under the title “Bond Interest Facility”, provision of authorizations for the signature of Agreements» and other provisions of urgent nature
N. 4111 (αρθ.48), ΦΕΚ 18/Α/25.01.2013
3) Η δεύτερη τροποποίηση
ΠΡΑΞΗ ΝΟΜΟΘΕΤΙΚΟΥ ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΥ
Έγκριση του Σχεδίου της δεύτερης Σύμβασης Τροπο− ποίησης της Κύριας Σύμβασης Χρηματοδοτικής Διευ− κόλυνσης μεταξύ του Ευρωπαϊκού Ταμείου Χρημα− τοπιστωτικής Σταθερότητας (Ε.Τ.Χ.Σ.), της Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας, του Ελληνικού Ταμείου Χρηματοπι− στωτικής Σταθερότητας (Τ.Χ.Σ.) και της Τράπεζας της Ελλάδος (ΤτΕ).
Δημοσίευση ΦΕΚ 262Α/17 -12- 2014 (παράταση σύμβασης έως 28/02/2015) λεπτομέρειες εδώ, ν. 4316/2014 αρθ 70 ΦΕΚ 270Α/24-12-2014
Κύρωση
Αρ. Τροπολογίας: 2234/207 20.12.2014 Αρχείο: .pdf
Υπουργείο: Υγείας
Περιγραφή: Κύρωση της Πράξης Νομοθετικού Περιεχομένου ¨Έγκριση του Σχεδίου της δεύτερης Σύμβασης Τροποποίησης της Κύριας Σύμβασης Χρηματοδοτικής Διευκόλυνσης μεταξύ του Ευρωπαϊκού Ταμείου Χρηματοπιστωτικής Σταθερότητας (Ε.Τ.Χ.Σ.), της Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας, του Ελληνικού Ταμείου Χρηματοπιστωτικής Σταθερότητας (Τ.Χ.Σ.) και της Τράπεζας της Ελλάδος¨
Η (εκπρόθεσμη) τροπολογία κατατέθηκε σε νομοσχέδιο του Υπουργείου Υγείας με τίτλο “Ίδρυση Παρατηρητηρίου Άνοιας, βελτίωση Περιγεννητικής Φροντίδας και ρυθμίσεις θεμάτων αρμοδιότητας Υπουργείου Υγείας” περισσότερες λεπτομέρειες εδώ
Ν. 4316/2014 (ΦΕΚ Α 270/24-12-2014) Ίδρυση παρατηρητηρίου άνοιας, βελτίωση περιγεννητικής φροντίδας, ρυθμίσεις θεμάτων αρμοδιότητας Υπουργείου Υγείας και άλλες διατάξεις.
Πατήστε εδώ για να δείτε, σε μορφή PDF, το άρθρο 70 του ν. 4316/2014 το οποίο περιλαμβάνει την κύρωση της ΠΝΠ Περισσότερα εδώ
4) Η τρίτη τροποποίηση
(1) A Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement was made between the Parties hereto on 15 March 2012.
(2) The Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement was amended by the First Amendment Agreement dated 12 December 2012, and a Second Amendment Agreement dated 19 December 2014 (the “Master Facility Agreement”).
Το email Βαρουφάκη μεταφρασμένο στα Ελληνικά (Eurogroup 09/03/2015)
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ
– Loan Facility Agreement with the amendment of February 2012 – Η δανειακή σύμβαση της 8 Μαΐου 2010 (η οποία δεν κυρώθηκε από την Ελληνική Δημοκρατία) όπως αναθεωρήθηκε στης 27 Φεβρουαρίου 2012
– ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ ΝΟΜΟΘΕΤΙΚΟΥ ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΥ 07.10.2009 – 11.10.2013 [Κατάλογος]
– Κασιμάτης: Η εξουσία που ασκείται βάσει των Συμβάσεων με την Τροικα είναι πραξικόπημα
JusticeForGreece 
ΠΡΑΞΗ ΝΟΜΟΘΕΤΙΚΟΥ ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΥ 19/04/2012 (16)
Ρυθμίσεις θεμάτων κεφαλαιακής ενίσχυσης των πιστωτικών ιδρυμάτων [Τροποποίηση του ν. 3864/2010 (Α΄119) περί ιδρύσεως Ελληνικού Ταμείου Χρηματοπιστωτικής Σταθερότητας ( αύξηση του κεφαλαίου του από 10 δις σε 50 δις, ρύθμιση δικαιωμάτων οικονομικής φύσης που απορρέουν από τη συμμετοχή του Ταμείου στο μετοχικό κεφάλαιο πιστωτικών ιδρυμάτων, της συμμέτοχης της Τράπεζας της Ελλάδας στην αύξηση μετοχικού κεφαλαίου κλπ ). Τροποποιήση του ν. 3601/2007 (Α΄178) “Ανάληψη και άσκηση δραστηριοτήτων από τα πιστωτικά ιδρύματα, επάρκεια ιδίων κεφαλαίων των πιστωτικών ιδρυμάτων και των επιχειρήσεων παροχής επενδυτικών υπηρεσιών και λοιπές διατάξεις.”. Τροποποίηση του ν. 3556/2007 (Α΄91) “Προϋποθέσεις διαφάνειας για την πληροφόρηση σχετικά με εκδότες των οποίων οι κινητές αξίες έχουν εισαχθεί προς διαπραγμάτευση σε οργανωμένη αγορά και άλλες διατάξεις. “]
Δημοσίευση ΦΕΚ 94/Α/19-04-2012
Υπογράφουν: ΠΑΠΑΔΗΜΟΣ, πρόεδρος υπουργικού συμβουλίου, ΠΑΓΚΑΛΟΣ, ΡΕΠΠΑΣ, ΓΙΑΝΝΙΤΣΗΣ, ΣΑΧΙΝΙΔΗΣ, ΑΒΡΑΜΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, ΒΟΡΙΔΗΣ, ΚΟΥΤΡΟΥΜΑΝΗΣ, ΣΚΑΝΔΑΛΙΔΗΣ, ΜΙΛΤΙΑΔΗΣ ΠΑΠΑΪΩΑΝΝΟΥ,
ΧΡΥΣΟΧΟΪΔΗΣ, ΓΕΡΟΥΛΑΝΟΣ, ΣΤΑΥΡΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, ΚΑΨΗΣ, ΠΑΝΤΕΛΗΣ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, ΡΑΓΚΟΥΣΗΣ, ΞΥΝΙΔΗΣ, μέλη
01/08/2012: Κατάθεση στη Βουλή
13/09/2012: Κύρωση, τροποποίηση, κύρωση άλλων δυο ΠΝΠ
Τίτλος
Κύρωση της Πράξης Νομοθετικού Περιεχομένου «Ρυθμίσεις θεμάτων κεφαλαιακής ενίσχυσης των πιστωτικών ιδρυμάτων», της Πράξης Νομοθετικού Περιεχομένου «Ρυθμίσεις θεμάτων εφαρμογής των νόμων 3864/2010, 4021/2011, 4046/2012, 4051/2012 και 4071/2012», της Πράξης Νομοθετικού Περιεχομένου «Ρυθμίσεις θεμάτων δημοσίευσης οικονομικών εκθέσεων πιστωτικών ιδρυμάτων και θυγατρικών τους, οι οποίες δραστηριοποιούνται στο χρηματοοικονομικό τομέα» και άλλες διατάξεις του Υπουργείου Οικονομικών
Αριθμός Φεκ
180 Α’/20.09.2012
Αριθμός Νόμου 4079
μίνι ιστορικό
On 8 May 2010, the Kingdom of Belgium, Ireland, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Finland and KfW (acting in the public interest, subject to the instructions of and with the benefit of the guarantee of the Federal Republic of Germany) (as Lenders) entered into a EUR 80,000,000,000 loan facility agreement (the “Loan Facility Agreement”) with Greece and the Bank of Greece which provides stability support to Greece in an inter-governmental framework via pooled bilateral loans.
(4) On 8 February 2012 Greece requested further financial assistance from the euro-area Member States. In accordance with the Statement by the Heads of State or Government of the euro area and EU institutions of 21 July and 26/27 October 2011, EFSF will be used as the financing vehicle for future disbursements to Greece under the financial assistance of the euro-area Member States.
(5) On 1 March 2012 a Memorandum of Understanding (the “PSI MoU”) was entered into between the European Commission, Greece and the Bank of Greece relating to (i) a voluntary liability management transaction by way of voluntary bond exchange to be entered into between Greece and certain private sector investors as described in the statement of the Euro Summit dated 26 October 2011 (the “Voluntary Liability Management Transaction”); (ii) a buy-back offer (the “Buy-Back Offer”) whereby Greece, acting through the ECB as its agent, offers to buy-back from Eurosystem national central banks (“NCBs”) certain marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by Greece which are held by NCBs as collateral for Eurosystem monetary policy operations with eligible counterparties; (iii) the payment of accrued interest on the bonds that will be exchanged under the Voluntary Liability Management Transaction, which will be financed in part or in whole by EFSF (the “Bond Interest Transaction”); and (iv) the provision of support in bank recapitalisation programmes of financial institutions in Greece (the “Bank Recapitalisation Transaction”). The PSI MoU is separate from and in addition to the Memorandum of Understanding originally signed on 3 May 2010, as last amended by the Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding (Fifth Addendum) of 6 December 2011, between the European Commission, Greece and the Bank of Greece (the “2011 Memorandum of Understanding” which, together with the PSI MoU and any subsequent or supplemental memoranda of understanding or addendum to any of them, is the “MoU”).
(6) Upon the request of financial assistance from Greece and in line with the PSI MoU, EFSF has entered into Financial Assistance Facility Agreements with Greece and the Bank of Greece, to provide the following Financial Assistance Facilities: (i) on 1 March 2012, a financial assistance facility agreement of up to EUR 30,000,000,000 in order to permit Greece to finance, in part, the Voluntary Liability Management Transaction (the “PSI LM Facility”); (ii) on 1 March 2012, a financial assistance facility agreement of EUR 35,000,000,000 in order to permit Greece to finance the Buy-Back Offer (the “ECB Credit Enhancement Facility”); (iii) on 1 March 2012, a financial assistance facility agreement of EUR 5,500,000,000 in order to facilitate the making of payments in relation to accrued interest under certain outstanding sovereign bonds issued or guaranteed by Greece, in the context of the Voluntary Liability Management Transaction, such payments to be made at the time and to the extent that such sovereign bonds are exchanged for New Greek Bonds (the “Bond Interest Facility”); and (iv) on 1 March 2012, a financial assistance facility agreement of up to EUR 23,000,000,000 in order to finance the recapitalisation of certain financial institutions in Greece (the “Existing Bank Recapitalisation Facility”).
(7) A Memorandum of Understanding was entered into between the Commission, the Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece on or around 14 March 2012 in relation to this Agreement. The availability and the provision of Financial Assistance under this Agreement, including pursuant to the Facilities (as defined below) made available under the Facility Specific Terms (as defined below), shall, unless otherwise specified, be conditional upon (i) the Beneficiary Member State’s compliance with the measures set out in the MoU and (ii) the Guarantors deciding favourably, on the basis of the findings of the regular assessments carried out by the Commission in liaison with the ECB in accordance with the Council Decision of the European Union on the basis of Articles 126(9) and 136 of TFEU on 12 July 2011 (which recast the former Council Decision 2010/320/EU of 10 May 2010 as amended), that the economic policy of the Beneficiary Member State accords with the adjustment programme and with the conditions laid down by the Council in the Decision and any other conditions laid down by the Council or in the MoU.
Click to access efsf_greece_fafa.pdf
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΟ
Amendment to EFSF Framework Agreement
The EFSF financial assistance programme for Greece (from FAQ on the EFSF)
1 – What is the second programme for Greece?
At the Eurozone summit held on 26 October 2011, Heads of State or Government agreed to a second financial assistance programme for Greece. The first financial support programme for Greece (April 2010) involved bilateral loans from euro area Member States (known as the Greek Loan Facility, or GLF) amounting to €52.9 bn, and a €20.1 bn loan from the IMF. It did not involve the EFSF.
2 – What is the policy conditionality agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)?
The Greek authorities’ economic program aimed at restoring competitiveness and growth, attaining fiscal sustainability and financial stability. To achieve this goal, measures were taken: to make the labour market more dynamic to improve competitiveness, and reduce unemployment; to improve the fiscal position by improving tax collection, reducing the size of government and more efficiently targeting social transfers; to strengthen the framework for bank resolution and recapitalization and for financial sector oversight; to reduce the level of public and private sector debt.
3 – What is the amount of financial assistance committed to Greece by the EFSF in the second programme?
The details and amounts of financial assistance committed by the EFSF are outlined in the table below. In addition, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) committed €28 billion under the second programme.
Purpose
Amount (€ bn)
Budgetary financing (cash)
49.5
Bank recapitalisation (cashless)
48.2
PSI facility (cashless)
29.7
Bond interest facility (cashless)
4.9
Debt buy-back (cashless)
11.3
Total
143.6 1
 4 – What was the objective of Private Sector Involvement (PSI)?
The objective was to secure the decline of the Greek debt to GDP ratio with an objective of reaching 120% by 2020. Due to the high take-up of the bond swap, Greece’s debt is expected to fall below 120% of GDP in 2020.
5 – What are the details of the PSI?
The public offer for the PSI was launched by the Hellenic Republic on 24 February and closed on 8 March. On 9 March, it was announced that bondholders holding 85.8% of Greece’s Greek law bonds agreed to the bond swap2. The activation of Collective Action Clauses lifted the participation rate to 95.7%. This led to a 53.5% reduction in the nominal face value of Greek debt held by private investors
1 Initially, the amount committed by the EFSF was €144.6 billion. However, around €1 bn committed to Greece under the PSI and bond interest facilities was not requested by Greece before the availability period ended, therefore this amount was cancelled.
2 Further details are available on https://www.bondcompro.com/greeceexchange/genDocuments.asp

which corresponds to a reduction in the debt stock of approximately €107 billion for Greece.
6 – What were the PSI and bond interest facilities?
PSI facility: as part of the voluntary debt exchange, Greece offered investors EFSF bonds (1 and 2 years). These EFSF bonds, provided to holders of bonds under Greek law, were subsequently rolled over into longer maturities.
Bond interest (accrued interest) facility: to enable Greece to repay accrued interest on outstanding Greek sovereign bonds under Greek law which will be included in the PSI. Greece offered investors EFSF 6-month bills. The bills were subsequently rolled over into longer maturities to ensure smooth market operations.
7 – How did EFSF fund the financial assistance for Greece?
The EFSF has used a flexible, diversified funding strategy to ensure that amounts funded are spread over the entire length of the programme. This also means that EFSF is able to take advantage of the best possible market conditions.
The PSI contribution, accrued interest and loan programme (excluding the amount earmarked for bank recapitalisations) were financed through the markets. The collateral enhancement for the Eurosystem was a cashless operation. This was also the case for the recapitalisation of Greek banks which was financed by the provision of EFSF bonds.
8 – What decisions were taken by the Eurogroup in November 2012?
Following an assessment by the European Commission, ECB and IMF that Greece had in a satisfactory manner implemented all the previously agreed policy reforms, the Eurogroup formally approved the second disbursement under the second economic adjustment programme for Greece.
The Eurogroup noted that the outlook for the sustainability of Greek government debt had worsened compared to March 2012 when the second programme was concluded, mainly due to a deteriorated macro-economic situation and delays in programme implementation. Therefore, the Eurogroup approved a set of measures (first proposed on 27 November 2012) designed to ease Greece’s debt burden and bring its public debt back on a sustainable path, so that a level of debt-to-GDP of 124% could be achieved in 2020. These measures included:
Reduction of the Greek Loan Facility (GLF – bilateral loans to Greece) interest margin: A lowering by 100 basis points of the interest rate charged to Greece on the loans provided under the GLF (Member States under a full financial assistance programme are not required to participate in the lowering of the GLF interest rates for the period in which they receive themselves financial assistance). This measure is estimated to lower the financing needs of the country by €1.9 billion by 2016.
Cancellation of the EFSF guarantee commitment fee (conditional upon the continued implementation of reforms by Greece): Cancellation of the guarantee commitment fee, amounting 10 basis points, paid by Greece on the EFSF loans. This measure is estimated to save a total of € 2.7 billion over the entire period of EFSF lending to Greece.
Maturity extension of GLF and EFSF loans: Even though the maturities of both loans by the GLF and the EFSF are long-term, this still creates an amortisation hump for Greece in 2020s, which could have hampered the country’s return to market financing. An extension of the maturities of the
Applies only to loans under EFSF Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement, i.e. does not apply to PSI Facility or Bond Interest Facility bilateral and EFSF loans by 15 years does not per se have an impact on the reduction of debt by 2020 or beyond, but significantly improves the country’s debt profile and improves conditions for a return to market financing.
Deferral of EFSF interest rate payments: A deferral of interest payments on EFSF loans by 10 years will allow Greece to reduce substantially its financing needs. This operation will not create additional costs for the EFSF since Greece will have to pay interest charges on the deferred interest. This measure is estimated to lower the financing needs of the country by a total of €12.9 billion by 2016.
SMP Income: A commitment by Member States to pass on to Greece’s segregated account an amount equivalent to the income on the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme (SMP) portfolio accruing to their national central bank as from budget year 2013 (Member States under a full financial assistance programme are not required to participate in this scheme for the period in which they receive themselves financial assistance).
Foregoing the previously programmed decline in the stock of T-Bills: The decisions made by policymakers envisage maintaining a T-Bill stock of €15 billion through the end of the programme, thus reducing the financing needs of the country by €9 billion in the period 2012-2014 (or 1% of GDP).
Postponing part of the Treasury cash buffer build-up: The March programme had foreseen a build-up of the Treasury cash buffer by €5 billion to provide some flexibility to the Greek treasury. Decisions taken in Eurogroup meetings suggest that the cash buffer build-up is partially postponed after the expiration of the programme. Over the 2012-2014 period, the cash buffer build-up is now reduced to €1.5 billion, and it is set to increase by an additional €2 billion in 2015-2016.
Other contingent measures: Greece and other euro area Member States will consider further measures and assistance, including inter alia lower co-financing in structural funds and/or further reduction of the interest rate on the Greek Loan Facility, if necessary, to ensure that Greece can reach a debt-to-GDP ratio of 124% in 2020, and in 2022 a debt-to-GDP ratio substantially lower than 110%. This is contingent on Greece reaching an annual primary surplus, as envisaged in the current MoU and full implementation of all conditions contained in the programme.
The Eurogroup also stressed that the benefits of the above-mentioned measures would accrue to Greece in a phased manner and conditional upon the continued implementation of agreed reforms.
9 – How were these measures related to the buy-back of Greek debt?
Final approval for the above measures was conditional upon the success of a debt buy-back operation conducted by the Greek government. The buy-back applied to the new Greek sovereign bonds (NGGBs) issued in the context of the Private Sector Initiative (PSI) operation of March 2012. It was conducted through a tender operation open to all market participants holding NGGBs of any outstanding series. The debt buy-back (announced by the Greek Ministry of Finance on 3 December and completed on 11 December 2012) reduced the amount of the country’s nominal debt by approximately €21 billion (in net terms).
10 – How was the debt buy-back financed?
The EFSF is providing a loan, within the envelope of the second financial assistance programme to Greece, to finance the buy-back operation. For this purpose, the EFSF issued six-month notes for a total nominal amount of €11.3 billion, which were transferred to the Greek government on December 19, 2012.
 11 – What are the other components in the current disbursement of financial assistance to Greece?
The EFSF will provide funds to the Greek government for the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) to finance the recapitalization and resolution costs of selected banks. In addition, the EFSF will provide funds to the Greek government for its budgetary financing needs.
12 – Are there any specific transferability restrictions on the EFSF notes disbursed in the context of bank recapitalisation?
No. In what concerns the EFSF notes disbursed in the context of bank recapitalizations, there are no specific transferability restrictions upon note holders other than those generally applicable pursuant to the terms and conditions of any notes issued under the EFSF Debt Issuance Programme.
The EFSF may only impose additional transferability restrictions on the basis of contractual agreements in place between the EFSF and a note holder which then would restrict only such note holder.
In case a market participant acquires legal title to EFSF notes – for example, in the context of a repo transaction with a recapitalised bank – and in the absence of an additional contractual arrangement, only the terms and conditions of such EFSF notes would apply.
13 – The EFSF financial assistance programme for Greece was due to end on 31 December 2014. Why was it extended?
The EFSF Board of Directors decided on 19 December 2014 today to grant Greece a two-month technical extension of its second Economic Adjustment Programme, financed by the EFSF. Instead of ending on 31 December 2014, the EFSF programme was extended until 28 February 2015. The decision follows a request from the Greek Finance Minister.
On 27 February 2015, the EFSF Board of Directors extended further the Greek MFFA’s availability period by four months until 30 June 2015. Without the extension, Greece would not be able to receive the final disbursement from the EFSF of €1.8 bn. The disbursement of this last loan tranche is conditional on the successful conclusion of the final review under the current arrangement and a unanimous decision by the EFSF Board of Directors.
The availability of €10.9 billion held by the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) in EFSF bonds was also extended until 30 June 2015. These bonds had been transferred to the HFSF in the past as part of the current arrangement for the recapitalisation and resolution of Greek banks. According to the amended MFFA, the bonds were returned to the EFSF. They can be released to Greece only on request by the European Central Bank (ECB) / Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The purpose of these bonds is to cover bank recapitalisation and resolution costs.
Click to access FAQ%20-%20EFSF%20financial%20assistance%20programme%20for%20Greece.pdf
FAQ document on Greece
Last updated: 3 July 2015
1. How much has the EFSF disbursed to Greece?
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) did not exist when the first programme of bilateral loans by the euro area Member States for Greece, the Greek Loan Facility (GLF), was agreed in early 2010. TheEFSFprogramme,partofthesecondEconomicAdjustmentProgrammeforGreece,started on1March2012. TheEFSFhasdisbursed€130.9billion,makingitGreece’slargestcreditorbyfar.The GLF had a total volume of €52.9 billion. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has disbursed €34.8 billion.
2. Did the euro area partners decide to end the EFSF programme for Greece?
No. Without an agreement to extend it, the EFSF programme expire d on 30 June. Greece’s euro area partners were prepared to extend the EFSF programme further, just as they had e xtended it twice in the past. Instead of ending on 31 December 2014, the EFSF Board of Directors’ decision of 19 December 2014 extended the programme until 28 February 2015. On 27 February 2015, the EFSF Board of Directors extended the availability period of the EFSF loan contract with Greece, called the Greek Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement (MFFA), by a further four months, until 30 June 2015.
The EFSF made all the preparations necessary to further prolong the programme before the expiry date. Four days before the programme’s end, the Greek government abandoned negotiations and decided to hold a referendum on the terms of the extension as proposed by its partners, to take place aftertheprogrammeexpiry. Afternegotiatingforfivemonthsandacceptingmostofthetermson the table, the Greek government advised voters to reject the programme in the referendum. Under these circumstances, the Eurogroup decided that there was no possibility to extend the programme.
3. What are the amounts that Greece missed out on?
AnextensionwouldhaveallowedGreecetocontinuetobeeligibleforadisbursementofthelastEFSF loan tranche of €1.8 billion. Additionally, Greece could have benefitted from the €10.9 billion of EFSF funds that are earmarked for bank recapitalisation or bank resolution. With an extension of the EFSF programme, Greece would have been eligible in principle for a disbursement on 30 June to cover a €1.6 billion repayment to the IMF. It would also have had access to funds from related agreements including the transfer by euro area Member States of the profit from Greek government bonds held by Eurosystem central banks in an amount of €1.85 billion.
4. What happens with EFSF loans now that Greece defaulted on the IMF, and may default on the ECB?
For the EFSF, Greece officially defaulted on the IMF when the IMF Managing Director informed the IMF Board on 1 July 2015 that Greece failed to meet a payment obligation. According to the EFSF loan
contract (Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement, MFFA) with Greece, such a default triggers the MFFA’s cross-default clause.
In line with a recommendation by the EFSF CEO, Klaus Regling, the EFSF Board of Directors decided on 3 July 2015 to opt for a Reservation of Rights on EFSF loans to Greece. The other two possible options were to request immediate repayment of its loans or to waive the EFSF’s right to action. By issuing a Reservation of Rights, the EFSF keeps all its options open as a creditor as events in Greece evolve. The situation will be continuously monitored and the EFSF will consider its position regularly.
A failed redemption of the maturing bond held by the ECB would mean Greece has defaulted on its obligation under the terms of that bond. If the amount is above €250 million it also triggers cross- default clauses.
6. Will this impact the EFSF’s market access?
There is no reason for the EFSF’s market access to be affected. Under the EFSF operating model, the irrevocable guarantees issued by the euroarea MemberStates back the EFSF funding instruments and the EFSF’s ability to service its debt. In other words, the EFSF’s repayment capacity is not dependent on the ability of its debtors to honour their obligations in a timely fashion but on the credit strength of its guarantors. Market activity has sent no signal that investors doubt the validity of the EFSF guarantees.
7. What impact, if any, will this have on the EFSF rating?
All EFSF debt is backed by irrevocable and unconditional guarantees and over-guarantees provided by the euro area Member States. The EFSF rating therefore reflects the rating of its guarantors and not the credit quality of its borrowers, including Greece. According to the rating agencies’ assessments, the EFSF’s rating would not be impacted even under an adverse scenario, such as a Greek default.
In addition, there is a strong willingness and commitment by all the guarantors to honour their guarantees and the EFSF has robust processes surrounding the need for a guarantee call. The Early Warning System and the asset and liability management processes enable the EFSF to anticipate the risk of a shortfall that would lead to a guarantee call well in advance of its execution.
Greece’s principal repayments are largely due between 2023 and 2054. Before that, Greece has only modest payments to make. These could be covered by the EFSF liquidity buffer or with further issuances. Therefore guarantee calls are unlikely in the foreseeable future.
8. Will the EFSF have to write off its exposure to Greece now?
No. There is no automatic connection between a default and writing off Greece’s debt. Even after a default, the EFSF expects to be repaid in full by Greece. EFSF bondholdersare in no way at risk, as EFSF bonds are guaranteed by shareholders.
9. Will Member States now have to supply the money Greece is not paying?
No. EFSF Members will only be asked to step in with cash if EFSF guarantees are called, which would only occur if the EFSF were at risk of failing to make a payment to EFSF bondholder s. In other words, as long as the EFSF continues to have favourable market access and can refinanceits debt instruments,
it will not need to call the guarantees from Member States. There is no reason to believe that the EFSF will lose this market access.
To clarify the EFSF guarantee structure: the EFSF member countries guarantee the issuance of EFSF bills and bonds, not the loans to Greece or other former programme countries. Therefore calling guarantees will only be required if the EFSF does not have the necessary liquidity to repay its bonds. In fact, principal repayments by Greece are largely due between 2023 and 2054. Before that, Greece has only modest payments to make which the EFSF liquidity buffer or with further issuances could cover until 2023. Therefore, the liquidity situation for the EFSF would not change over the coming years even if Greece decided not to fully repay its obligations.
The total amount of guarantees would be shared by the guarantors, according to their EFSF contribution key. Greece and Ireland are not guarantors of EFSF bonds. Portugal and Cyprus will honour any guarantee commitments they made before stepping out of the guarantee mechanism when receiving financial assistance.
Thus the potential yearly budget implications for each of the EFSF guarantors would be very limited. Ultimately, the EFSF, and thereby its shareholders, will retain its claim on Greece even if the guarantees are called and EFSF bondholders reimbursed. Any writedown of this claim can only occur by mutual agreement between the debtor and creditors.
10. Wasn’t it clear from the start that the EFSF strategy would not work in Greece?
No. The EFSF and ESM strategy of providing loans against macroeconomic reforms, called ‘conditionality’, worked successfully. Ireland, Spain, and Portugal reformed their economies and budgets, regained full market access at very favourable conditions, and started growing again. This shift had also begun in Greece. Current account and budget deficits were adjusted, signs of positive growth returned, and Greece became a top reformer, according to the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development and World Bank assessments. In response, the markets started to accept Greek debt issuance again. But these improvements were interrupted in late 2014, pushing investors away.
11. Why did the EFSF not write down its exposure to Greece in its 2014 annual accounts?
According to the International Financial Reporting Standards, the accounting standards used by the EFSF,sucha writedown,orimpairment,isrecordedonlywhenaspecificeventtriggersaloss.In2014, the EFSF did not identify such an event with respect to Greece, which the EFSF’s external auditor confirmed.
In 2014, Greece’s economy returned to growth after several years of recession. Uncertainty on the future direction of policies affected confidence from the beginning of 2015. European authorities closely reviewed the situation of Greece and its public finances during the first months of 2015. The EFSF took part in these discussions and closely monitored developments through its Early Warning System. No events that could be objectively qualified as loss-triggering were identified in 2015 in the periodleadinguptothefinalisationandapprovaloftheEFSF’sannualaccountsfor2014. In particular, Greece met all its scheduled payment obligations to the EFSF.
12. What kind of progress did Greece make in the implementation of reforms?
After six years of recession, Greece’s economy returned to growth in 2014. In recent years, Greece significantly improved its fiscal balance: the government deficit was reduced to -3.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014 from -12.3% in 2013. It recorded a positive primary balance (i.e. excluding interest payments on debt) of around 1% of GDP in 2014 which was expected to continue in the coming years.
Greece made important progress on public finances and completed the recapitalisation of the four largest banks. It also made headway in monitoring and correcting public expenditure, including the downsizing of the public administration. Labour cost competitiveness and the business environment improved. The government implemented several important structural reforms in health care, the opening of professions, and public financial management.
A major success for Greece was its return to the bond markets in 2014, when it issued 3-year and 5- year bonds. This was a sign that it had started to regain the trust of investors.
Background on the EFSF programme to Greece
13. What led to Greece’s economic problems?
In the decade before the crisis, Greece failed to modernise its economy towards efficiency and productivity gains whilethepublicsectorgrewatunsustainablelevels. After Greece adopted the euro in 2001, it was able to borrow at much lower interest rates despite its deteriorating competitiveness and public finances.
Whilegovernmentspendingandborrowingincreased,taxrevenues –themainsourceofgovernment income – weakened due to poor tax administration. At the same time, rising wages undermined Greece’s competitiveness compared to other euro area countries. Low productivity and structural problems also contributed to the increasing economic difficulties. As a result, Greece’s economy contracted and unemployment began to climb to alarming levels.
Greece’s reliance on external financing for funding budget and trade deficits left its economy very vulnerable to shifts in investor confidence. In 2009, the Greek government revealed that previous governments had been misreporting government budget data. Much higher-than-expected deficit levels eroded investor confidence, causing the yields on Greek sovereign bonds, which correspond to the cost of borrowing money, to rise to unsustainable levels. The situation worsened to the point where the country was no longer able to refinance its borrowing, and it was forced to ask for help from its European partners and the IMF.
14. What did the first package of financial assistance for Greece consist of?
The first financial support programme for Greece, agreed in April 2010, consisted of bilateral loans from euro area Member States (known as the Greek Loan Facility, GLF), amounting to €52.9 billion, and a €20.1 billion loan from the IMF. The EFSF, which was only established in June 2010, did not take part in this programme.
15. What kind of reforms and policy measures did Greece agree to implement?
The objective of the macroeconomic adjustment programme was to durably restore Greece’s credibility with private investors by securing fiscal sustainability, safeguarding the stability of the financial system, and boosting potential growth and competitiveness.
This was to be achieved by carrying out fiscal consolidation, aimedat increasing government revenues and reducing expenses. Another major part of the programme was the implementation of structural reforms, including reforms in the: labour market to stimulate job creation and increase wage flexibility; product markets, especially in the services sector; public administration; and pension system. In addition, Greece was to privatise and restructure state-owned enterprises.
Reforms were also initiated to fight waste and corruption, along with measures to tackle tax evasion and step up collection of unpaid taxes.
16. Why was it necessary to have a second financial assistance package for Greece from the EFSF?
Greecemademajoreffortstoimplementwide-rangingmeasures,whichweretiedtothefirstfinancial assistance package. The challenges confronting Greece remained significant, however, with a large competitiveness gap, a large fiscal deficit, a high level of public debt, and an undercap italised banking system. The economic recession in Greece proved to be more serious and damaging than expected. The financial assistance provided under the first programme through bilateral loans from euro area countries and the IMF was not sufficient for Greece to make the necessary adjustments and to regain market access.
Furthermore,Greece’spublicdebt-to-GDPratiowasconsideredunsustainable.Arestructuringofdebt held by private creditors became necessary to bring the total debt level back to a s ustainable path. Additional time and funds were required to underpin Greece’s fiscal consolidation efforts with structural reforms, to boost growth, and improve competitiveness.
17. What was the Private Sector Involvement (PSI) and what was the EFSF’s role in it?
Under the PSI, the Greek debt held by private investors, mainly banks, was restructured in March 2012 to lighten Greece’s overall debt burden. About 97% of privately held Greek bonds(about €197 billion) took a 53.5% cut of the face value (principal) of the bond, corresponding to an approximately €107 billion reduction in Greece’s debt stock.
The EFSF provided two facilities to Greece to encourage bondholders to participate in the PSI. These were the:
o PSI facility – as part of the voluntary debt exchange, Greece offered investors 1- and 2-year EFSF bonds. These EFSF bonds, provided to holders of bonds under Greek law, were subsequently rolled over into longer maturities.
o Bond interest (accrued interest) facility – to enable Greece to repay accrued interest on outstanding Greek sovereign bonds under Greek law which were included in the PSI. Greece offered investors EFSF 6-month bills. The bills were subsequently rolled over into longer maturities.
18. What decisions did the Eurogroup take in November 2012?
Whenthesecondprogrammewasagreed,theEurogroupnotedthattheoutlookforthesustainability of Greek government debt had worsened compared to March 2012, mainly due to a deteriorated
5
macroeconomic situation and delays in programme implementation. Therefore, the Eurogroup approved a set of measures designed to ease Greece’s debt burden and bring its public debt back to a sustainable path, so that debt-to-GDP couldbe reduced to 124% by 2020 and to substantiallybelow 110% by 2022. These measures included:
o reducing the interest rate charged to Greece on the bilateral loans provided by the Greek Loan Facility (GLF) by 100 basis points.
o cancellingtheEFSFguaranteecommitmentfee(conditionaluponthecontinued implementation of reforms by Greece) of 10 basis points, which Greece pays on the EFSF loans. It is estimated that this measure will save a total of €2.7 billion over the entire period of EFSF lending to Greece.
o extending the maturity of GLF and EFSF loans by 15 years (to an average loan maturity of over 30 years), significantly improving the country’s debt profile.
o deferring interest rate payments on EFSF loans by 10 years, allowing Greece to reduce substantially its financing needs after a decade. This operation will not create any costs for the EFSF since Greece will pay interest charges on the deferred interest. It is estimated that this measure will lower the country’s financing needs by €12.9 billion by 2022.
o passing on to Greece an amount equivalent to the income of the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme (SMP) portfolio accruing to their national central bank as from budget year 2013.
19. How did Greece benefit from the extension of loan maturities and def erral of interest payments decided in November 2012?
The extension of loan maturities and deferral of interest payments significantly reduced Greece’s annual financing needs. This was instrumental in helping to bring Greece ’s public debt service back to a sustainable path, and made it easier for Greece to return to bond markets in 2014.
EFSF financial assistance in general has generated substantial savings for Greece: in 2013, these savings amounted to €8.6 billion, or 4.7% of Greece’s GDP. For 2014, they were €7.9 billion, or 4.4% of Greece’s GDP (based on reasonable assumptions; for details see the ESM 2013 and 2014 Annual Reports).ThesesavingswerepossiblebecausetheEFSFprovidedloanstoGreece(aswellastoIreland and Portugal) at much lower interest rates than those that the market theoretically would have offered.
The savings increase further when we include all the other measures the euro area governments took to alleviate Greece’s debt burden, such as the extension of the maturity of the EFSF and bilateral GLF loans to more than 30 years, the reduction in the GLF interest rates, the 10-year interest rate deferral or the cancelation of the interest rate margin. All combined, these improvements produced an economicreductionofthedebtburdenof49%ofGreece’s2013GDP orof50% oftheEuropeanofficial sectorloans.ThesesavingsgreatlyimproveddebtsustainabilityandprovidedGreecewithfiscalspace.
Click to access 2015_07_03%20FAQ%20on%20Greece%20-%20update.pdf
Ministerial statement on 27 June 2015
Ministers from eighteen euro area Member States and the institutions held an informal meeting to discuss the forthcoming expiration of the current EFSF financial arrangement with Greece, after the break-up of the negotiations with the Greek authorities.
The strengthening of EMU has been instrumental in helping the euro area to overcome the legacy of the financial crisis. We have notably advanced fiscal consolidation, implemented ambitious structural reforms, improved our fiscal and economic governance, deepened financial integration and established efficient firewalls. We are in a much stronger position than during the crisis.
Euro area Member States intend to make full use of all the instruments available to preserve the integrity and stability of the euro area. This will complement any actions the European Central Bank may take in full independence and in line with its mandate. EFSF and ESM remain the strong instruments with our full backing that they have always been.
We commit to take all necessary measures to further improve the resilience of our economies. We stand ready to take decisive steps to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union.
We stress that the expiry of the EFSF financial arrangement with Greece, without immediate prospects of a follow-up arrangement, will require measures by the Greek authorities, with the technical assistance of the institutions, to safeguard the stability of the Greek financial system. The Eurogroup will monitor very closely the economic and financial situation in Greece and the Eurogroup stands ready to reconvene to take appropriate decisions where needed, in the interest of Greece as euro area member.
We stand ready to assist and support Greece and the Greek people as required, following the expiration of the EFSF financial arrangement.
[The statement is adopted by ministers from the euro area Member States, except Greece].
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2) Eurogroup statement on Greece (27/06/2015)
Since the 20 February 2015 agreement of the Eurogroup on the extension of the current financial assistance arrangement, intensive negotiations have taken place between the institutions and the Greek authorities to achieve a successful conclusion of the review. Given the prolonged deadlock in negotiations and the urgency of the situation, institutions have put forward a comprehensive proposal on policy conditionality, making use of the given flexibility within the current arrangement.
Regrettably, despite efforts at all levels and full support of the Eurogroup, this proposal has been rejected by the Greek authorities who broke off the programme negotiations late on the 26 June unilaterally. The Eurogroup recalls the significant financial transfers and support provided to Greece over the last years. The Eurogroup has been open until the very last moment to further support the Greek people through a continued growth-oriented programme.
The Eurogroup takes note of the decision of the Greek government to put forward a proposal to call for a referendum, which is expected to take place on Sunday July 5, which is after the expiration of the programme period. The current financial assistance arrangement with Greece will expire on 30 June 2015, as well as all agreements related to the current Greek programme including the transfer by euro area Member States of SMP and ANFA equivalent profits.
The euro area authorities stand ready to do whatever is necessary to ensure financial stability of the euro area.
[1] Supported by all members of the Eurogroup except the Greek member.
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30 June 2015 – EFSF programme for Greece expires today
Luxembourg –The Greek financial assistance programme of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) expires tonight at midnight CET. As a result, the last EFSF loan tranche of €1.8 billion will no longer be available for Greece and the €10.9 billion in EFSF notes to cover the potential cost of bank recapitalisation or bank resolution in Greece will be cancelled.
Klaus Regling, CEO of the EFSF, said: “It is regrettable for Greece that the EFSF programme will expire today without any follow-up arrangement and that the positive results of the programme are put at risk. Due to the economic policies adopted under the EFSF programme, the country was on a good path towards strong growth until the second half of 2014. The many sacrifices which the Greek people had to make were paying off. Greece managed to cut its budget deficit and regain competitiveness. The country was able to access financial markets again and saw its high unemployment start declining. According to the OECD and World Bank, Greece was a reform champion until 2014, with encouraging growth prospects. This trend can continue if the Greek population decides to return to the path of reform within the euro area.”
The EFSF programme started on 21 February 2012. It was originally due to end on 31 December 2014, but was extended twice upon request of the Greek government. In the context of the programme, the EFSF disbursed €141.8 billion to Greece. It included €48.2 billion to cover the costs of bank resolution and recapitalisation. Of this amount, €10.9 billion in EFSF notes was not needed and was later returned to the EFSF. Accordingly, the outstanding loan amount stands at €130.9 billion. This makes the EFSF Greece’s largest creditor by far.
Greece’s financial assistance programme was unique in many aspects. Due to the seriousness of the country’s structural weaknesses and adjustment needs, it was the biggest EFSF or ESM programme ever. It also had by far the most favourable lending conditions ever granted to an EFSF or ESM programme country. It included Private Sector Involvement with sizeable losses for private investors. Greece benefits from an average loan maturity of over 30 years. The country pays neither interest rates nor redemption on the overwhelming part of its EFSF loans until 2023. These favourable lending conditions provided Greece with budgetary savings of over €16 billion for 2013 and 2014 combined. That corresponds to more than 4% of Greek GDP in each of the two years.
01 July 2015 EFSF takes note of Greece’s non-payment to IMF
Luxembourg – The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) takes note of a public statement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that a Greek non-payment has occurred. It is the EFSF’s understanding that the IMF Managing Director has informed the IMF Executive Board. This will be confirmed by a meeting of the Executive Board, expected later today. For the EFSF, this would constitute an event of default for certain EFSF loans.
The EFSF also takes note of the fact that the IMF received a request yesterday from the Greek authorities for an extension of Greece’s repayment obligation that fell due yesterday. The IMF’s Executive Board intends to examine this request in due course.
In line with EFSF guidelines, EFSF CEO Klaus Regling must inform the chairman of the Eurogroup Working Group and the EFSF Board of Directors today of the non-payment and propose one of the following three options:
acceleration of the loan: this means that the EFSF cancels the loan contract and requests immediate repayment of the principal and interest amounts;
waiver of rights: this means that the EFSF irrevocably waives its right and remedies under the loan for this specific non-payment;
reservation of rights: this means that the EFSF neither accelerates the loan nor waives its right to do so, but instead reserves the right to act at a later stage.
The EFSF will coordinate its next steps very closely with the Eurogroup Working Group, where its shareholders are represented, and with the European Commission and the IMF.
The Greek non-payment has no influence on the EFSF’s capacity to repay its bondholders. Investors know that EFSF bonds benefit from a very strong guarantee structure.
03 July 2015 EFSF Board of Directors reserves its rights to act upon Greece’s default
Luxembourg – The Board of Directors of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) decided today to opt for a Reservation of Rights on EFSF loans to Greece, after the non-payment of Greece to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Following the IMF Managing Director’s notification of the IMF Executive Board, this non-payment results in an Event of Default by Greece, according to EFSF financial agreements with Greece.
In line with a recommendation by the EFSF’s CEO Klaus Regling, the EFSF Board of Directors decided not to request immediate repayment of its loans nor to waive its right to action – the other two possible options. By issuing a Reservation of Rights, the EFSF keeps all its options open as a creditor as events in Greece evolve. The situation will be continuously monitored and the EFSF will consider its position regularly.
Mr Regling said: “The EFSF is Greece’s biggest creditor. This event of default is cause for deep concern. It breaks the commitment made by Greece to honour its financial obligations to all its creditors, and it opens the door to severe consequences for the Greek economy and the Greek people. The EFSF will closely coordinate with the euro area Member States, the European Commission, and the IMF on its future actions.”
The EFSF loans concerned are €109.1 billion under the Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement, €5.5 billion under the Bond Interest Facility Agreement and €30 billion under Private Sector Involvement Facility Agreement.
The Greek non-payment has no influence on the EFSF’s capacity to repay its bondholders. Investors know that EFSF bonds benefit from a robust guarantee structure.
The EFSF Board of Directors is composed of deputy finance ministers and senior officials of each EFSF Member. It is chaired by Hans Vijlbrief, Treasurer-General at the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands.
Letter to the FT clarifying the implications of a Greek default on EFSF shareholders – Published on 9 July 2015
Eurozone member states and EFSF loans to Greece
Sir, The Lex column “Greece: over to EU” (July 7) is misleading in several ways. Greece owes the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) €130.9bn, not “over €140bn”, as Lex states, unless you include interest rate payments. Contrary to Lex’s claim, a Greek default would not trigger the guarantees of eurozone member states. Member states guarantee EFSF bonds, not the EFSF loans to Greece.
Furthermore, the EFSF does not face any liquidity shortage as a result of Greek actions. Up until 2023, the country is only obliged to pay small amounts to the EFSF, because interest rate payments and redemptions on the biggest part of the EFSF loans to Greece have been deferred by 10 years. Even if you assume that Greece fails to honour its interest rate and redemption obligations to the EFSF, eurozone member states would only have to jump in with funds from 2023 through 2054, the year when the last EFSF loan tranche falls due. Under this hypothetical scenario eurozone member states would split up the Greek obligations among themselves, according to their share in the EFSF and over a more than 30-year time span. This means that the annual budgetary impact for each country concerned would be quite manageable.
Wolfgang Proissl
Chief Spokesperson, EFSF/ESM, Luxembourg
Click to access Letter%20to%20the%20FT%20clarifying%20the%20implications%20of%20a%20Greek%20default%20on%20EFSF%20shareholders.pdf

ft.com/lex
July 6, 2015 7:07 pm
FT Greece: over to EU
If debt relief had come earlier, the eurozone would not be facing this moment of truth at all
The moment of truth approaches. Angela Merkel and the other eurozone leaders must decide: do a deal with the Greek government or walk away. If they choose the latter, Greece will probably need a new currency and a new banking system, and face a deep recession. The cost of all that is hard to know. What is measurable is the pile of Greek debt that will not be honoured in this scenario. Who wears the losses?
While Greece’s economy is small in eurozone terms — accounting for less than 2 per cent of the bloc’s output — its €313bn of central government debt (on Greek debt management agency data) is almost twice its economic output. Of that, €21bn is owed to the IMF — not a big worry given, the fund’s €377bn financing capacity.
Eurozone creditors and taxpayers will take a bigger hit. Take the European Financial Stability Facility (now known as the European Stability Mechanism), the eurozone’s backstop for ailing states. Greece owes the EFSF more than €140bn. Unlike eurozone banks, the mechanism is yet to be stress-tested for default scenarios. Its loans were funded by investors, who bought EFSF bonds guaranteed by its sovereign backers. A Greek default would trigger those guarantees, forcing eurozone states to pay up. That would have to be funded by new debt issuance. Now add the nearly €150bn of Greek government bonds held by the European Central Bank and — as collateral on loans to Greek banks — by the central banks of the eurosystem. Bond write-offs would mean state recapitalisation of the ECB and eurosystem central banks if they could not live with negative capital.
The near €300bn of resulting additional debt could rattle capital markets which saw €250bn of net eurozone sovereign insurance last year. And sentiment towards the eurozone is unlikely to be upbeat, so borrowers will have to pay up.
It need not have been like this. If debt relief had come as soon as it became clear that the debts were unsustainable, the pain would have been no worse, and the eurozone would not be facing this moment of truth at all.
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Letter in response to this article:
Eurozone member states and EFSF loans to Greece / From Wolfgang Proissl